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“Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has
come.” 1
INTRODUCTION
The Due Process Clause 2 has recently undergone
something of a renaissance as a limitation to be applied to the
state tax jurisdiction rules pertaining to multistate businesses.
The 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case, Quill v. North Dakota, 3
suggested that the Due Process Clause was to play second
fiddle to the Commerce Clause 4 in such tax matters, and would
not typically be relevant given the more likely, more rigorous
application of the latter clause. 5 But Quill also suggested that
1. VICTOR HUGO, HISTORY OF A CRIME.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law.”)
3. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
4. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have the power “to regulate
commerce . . . among the several states”).
5. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.7 (“[Our prior] comments might suggest that
every tax that passes contemporary Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under
the Due Process Clause, [but] it does not follow that the converse is as well true:
A tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly burden interstate
commerce.”). The analysis in Quill was with respect to the “dormant Commerce
Clause.” Id. at 309 (“Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution expressly authorizes
Congress to ‘regulate Commerce’ with foreign Nations, and among the several
States. It says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence
of any action by Congress. Nevertheless . . . the Commerce Clause is more than
an affirmative grant of power; it has a negative sweep as well. The Clause . . . by
its own force prohibits certain state actions that interfere with interstate
commerce.”) (quotations omitted). See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer
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its logic was the product of a bygone era, 6 a point that is more
apparent nearly twenty-five years later. 7 In addition, the
relevance of the Quill holding—pertaining to state tax
jurisdiction or “nexus”—has diminished through changes in
commercial practices and later judicial developments, further
undercutting Quill’s statement as to the relationship between
the two constitutional clauses. 8 As a result, the Due Process
Clause has increased in importance relative to the Commerce
Clause in the context of state taxes—particularly corporate
income and sales tax—as applied to multistate businesses. 9
Recent state tax cases 10 and commentaries, 11 as well as
developments with respect to Congressional legislation
directed at state taxation, 12 have cast light on the renewed
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (“[Although the Commerce
Clause] does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate commerce, we have
long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority,
even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute”—the “so-called ‘dormant’
aspect of the Commerce Clause.”). All references in this Article to the Commerce
Clause are to the dormant Commerce Clause unless otherwise specified.
6. See infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
7. See Michael T. Fatale, Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Preemptions of State Tax, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV.
41, 85–89 (2012). See generally infra notes 28 and 116–47 and accompanying
text.
8. See infra notes 99–147 and accompanying text.
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller, 87 A.3d 1263 (Md.
2014) (affirming a state tax, in part by rejecting a due process challenge); Scioto
Ins. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 279 P.3d 782 (Okla. 2012) (striking down a
state tax on due process grounds); Griffith v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 728 S.E.2d
74 (W.Va. 2012) (striking down a state tax in part on due process grounds). See
also In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 485 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (federal
bankruptcy court finds state lacks tax jurisdiction over a corporation under the
Due Process Clause for purposes of pursuing a corporate income tax claim).
11. See, e.g., Paul H. Frankel, Craig B. Fields, & Richard C. Call, The Due
Process Clause as a Bar to State Tax Nexus, STATE TAX TODAY, (Oct. 29, 2012);
Mary Benton, Clark Calhoun & Elizabeth Cha, Due Process and Commerce
Clause Tests Are Never, Ever Getting Back Together, STATE TAX TODAY, (Jul. 22,
2013); Brian J. Kirkell, Craig Ridenour & Charles Britt, Sales Factor Presence
After McIntyre Machinery, STATE TAX TODAY, (Feb. 11, 2013); David Sawyer,
Practitioners Anticipate a Resurgence of Due Process Nexus Litigation, STATE TAX
TODAY, (Nov. 1, 2013); Brannon P. Denning, Due Process and Personal
Jurisdiction, Implications for State Taxes, STATE TAX TODAY, (Jun. 18, 2012).
12. See Red Earth v. United States, 657 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2011), vacated,
2013 Dist. LEXIS 188691 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding the states may lack the
capacity to impose tax jurisdiction under a recently-enacted federal statute, The
Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (“PACT”) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 375 et seq., given the
provisions of the Due Process Clause); Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (same); State’s Attorneys General: Marketplace Fairness Act Would Violate
Due Process Clause, STATE TAX TODAY, (June 18, 2013) (questioning the states’
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importance of the Due Process Clause. The commentary has
cited recent Supreme Court cases pertaining to the application
of the Due Process Clause in matters of adjudicative
jurisdiction, 13 because the analysis applied for purposes of
adjudicative and state tax jurisdiction is “comparable.” 14 In
particular, the Supreme Court’s decision in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 15 which pertains to “specific” as
opposed to “general” adjudicative jurisdiction, 16 is potentially
relevant to the state tax inquiry because state tax cases involve
questions of specific jurisdiction. 17
McIntyre was a plurality decision that rendered three
inconsistent opinions that failed to command a majority of the
Court. 18 As McIntyre was the first specific jurisdiction case
decided by the Court in twenty-four years, it was certain to
generate a great deal of scholarly attention in the important
area of adjudicative jurisdiction—a result enhanced by the
Court’s somewhat unclear precedential analysis. 19 The facts in
McIntyre do not resemble those in a typical fact pattern in
which state tax jurisdiction is at issue. 20 In part for this
reason, the case may be of less relevance in the state tax area. 21
However, given the increased importance of the due process

ability to impose tax jurisdiction under a proposed federal statute, the
Marketplace Fairness Act (“MFA”), S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th Cong. (2013),
given the potential application of the Due Process Clause). The PACT Act and
the MFA are discussed in greater detail infra notes 420-459 and accompanying
text.
13. See generally the articles noted supra note 11 and accompanying text.
The recent U.S. Supreme Court cases are Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
14. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306–08 (evaluating the Court’s adjudicative
jurisdiction cases and stating that “[c]omparable reasoning” applies to determine
state tax jurisdiction).
15. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
16. “Specific jurisdiction” refers to adjudicative jurisdiction where the lawsuit
“arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,” whereas
“general jurisdiction” obtains where a defendant’s “continuous corporate
operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from
those activities.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014).
17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See infra notes 211–12 and
accompanying text.
18. See generally infra notes 255–313 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 259–61, 314 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 333–38 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 324–48 and accompanying text.
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analysis in state tax cases, state tax practitioners must
carefully grapple with the multi-part McIntyre decision.
The enhanced emphasis on the due process analysis in
state tax jurisdiction cases has been a generally favorable
development for state governments seeking to impose their
taxes. The historic Commerce Clause analysis that the
Supreme Court applied to state tax jurisdiction cases often
relied upon arbitrary limitations that fostered aggressive tax
planning and resulted in decisions that were economically
questionable. 22 In contrast, greater reliance upon notions of
due process fairness has resulted in decisions that more closely
consider whether the taxpayer is being asked to pay its “just
share of the state tax burden.” 23
Although the trend emphasizing due process principles in
state tax jurisdiction cases has generally improved state tax
administration, recent cases and other legal developments
suggest several specific areas where the analysis remains
uncertain and potentially problematic. 24 In the corporate
income tax area, the states have wrestled for more than twenty
years with cases in which companies have sought to avoid
taxation through structural and transactional planning with
respect to company-owned intangible property, such as
trademarks. 25 The states have had significant success in these
cases, generally by arguing that the “physical presence” nexus
standard posited by Quill does not apply to the states’
corporate income tax—meaning that the relevant test largely
tracks the due process standard that determines adjudicative
jurisdiction. 26 However, more recent state cases suggest a
variation on this same tax planning that may further test the
reach of the states’ jurisdictional rules. 27
In the sales tax area, the major state tax issue continues
to be taxation of companies that exploit the state’s economic
market by making tax-free Internet sales in reliance upon the
Quill physical presence jurisdictional standard. 28 States have
22. See infra notes 56–76 and accompanying text.
23. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1981). See
generally infra notes 99–147 and accompanying text.
24. See generally infra Part III.
25. See infra notes 106–10 and 371–78 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 380–99 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 414–19 and accompanying text. A study by economists at
the University of Tennessee concluded that the states would collectively lose
$10.1 to $11.3 billion in sales tax for the 2012 tax year because of the rule in Quill.
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successfully applied due process-like fairness principles to
narrow the application of the Quill physical presence standard
to cases where the taxpayer’s reliance upon Quill is
reasonable. 29 But certain fact patterns continue to test the
state tax nexus rules, such as an Internet vendor using
affiliates or other in-state representatives to perform activities
Also, more
other than making actual Internet sales. 30
generally, twenty-three years after Quill suggested that
Congress could resolve the states’ sales tax jurisdictional
dilemma by legislating as to the appropriate standard,
Congress may finally be close to doing just that. 31 But some
commentators have questioned whether the Due Process
Clause could limit the effectiveness of such a Congressional
act. 32
Accordingly, this Article proceeds in four sections. The
first section traces the historical developments that have led to
the re-emergence of due process principles as the primary
limitation on the assertion of state tax jurisdiction. 33 This
section notes that the Commerce Clause was originally
intended to permit Congress to address situations where the
states were, through their tax or regulatory powers, engaged
in some form of economic discrimination favoring in-state
commercial actors relative to commercial actors located outside
the state. 34 A similar power of judicial oversight, applicable
even in the absence of Congressional legislation, was later
recognized by the Supreme Court—the application of the socalled dormant Commerce Clause. 35 Subsequent Supreme
Court cases broadened the focus of the Commerce Clause,
permitting the courts to go beyond the original intention of the
Commerce Clause and to generally engage in state tax cases in
subjective determinations as to whether the state tax somehow
inhibited free trade. 36 However, more recent Supreme Court
cases have generally re-posited the Commerce Clause as being
an inquiry that is primarily focused on the question of
See Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax
Revenue Losses from E-Commerce, 52 ST. TAX NOTES 537 (2009).
29. See generally infra notes 116–47 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 414–19 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 424–26 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 442–44 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part I.
34. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 5 and infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
36. See generally infra notes 56–76 and accompanying text.
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discrimination. 37
The first section notes the application of a second
constitutional inquiry, the Due Process Clause, which has
probed the states’ tax jurisdictional reach since the enactment
of the 14th Amendment. 38 This section demonstrates that as
the Commerce Clause inquiry has receded back to its intended
role of policing state tax discrimination—something that is not
usually an issue in state tax jurisdiction cases 39—courts have
primarily focused on the application of due process principles. 40
The second section evaluates the due process standards to
be applied in-state tax jurisdiction cases. 41 This section
considers the historic approach the Supreme Court has applied
and considers the Court’s recent adjudicative jurisdiction
cases, which apply by analogy in the state tax context. 42 This
section provides a detailed analysis of the Court’s recent
specific jurisdiction case, McIntyre, 43 which some persons have
claimed may impose additional limits upon the states in tax
jurisdiction cases. 44 This section concludes that the Court’s
recent adjudicative jurisdiction cases, including McIntrye,
should not impact the due process standards to be applied in
state tax cases. 45
The third section evaluates several recent state corporate
income tax and sales tax cases that have considered due
process jurisdiction questions, 46 in particular two recent state
supreme court cases that have applied the Due Process Clause
to impose limits upon a state’s assertion of corporate income
tax nexus. 47 This section also examines due process questions
recently raised by federal cases and commentary pertaining to
Congressional legislation that has either been enacted or

37. See infra notes 149–59 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 164–67 and
accompanying text.
39. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
40. See generally infra notes 77–147 and accompanying text.
41. See generally infra Part II.
42. Id.
43. See infra notes 262–368 and accompanying text.
44. See generally the articles cited supra note 11. See also infra note 341 and
accompanying text.
45. See generally Part II.
46. See infra notes 371–419 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 379–99 and accompanying text. The cases are Scioto Ins.
Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 279 P.3d 782 (Okla. 2012) and Griffith v. ConAgra
Brands, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 74 (W.Va. 2012).
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proposed with respect to state tax jurisdiction. 48
The final section offers some concluding remarks. 49 This
section concludes that the trend favoring the Due Process
Clause over the Commerce Clause as the primary principle
evaluating state tax jurisdiction applied to a multistate
business is a positive one for state taxing agencies and for state
tax administration in general.
I.

DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND DUE PROCESS
LIMITATIONS UPON THE IMPOSITION OF A STATE TAX

A. The Early History: Defining “Interstate Commerce” and
Policing State Tax Burdens
The Commerce Clause is set forth at Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. It states, as relevant to this
Article, that Congress shall have the power “to regulate
commerce . . . among the several states.” 50 It is an affirmative
grant of legislative power but has been held to have a dormant
aspect that allows it to be applied as a judicial limitation on
the states’ taxing or regulatory powers in court cases even in
the absence of Congressional action. 51
The application of the Commerce Clause as a limitation on
the taxing powers of the states has proven difficult for the
Supreme Court, which has utilized various interpretative
approaches through the years. The Commerce Clause was
intended to address state attempts at economic protectionism,
i.e., state attempts to favor in-state economic actors vis-à-vis
This form of economic
out-of-state economic actors. 52
protectionism was common under the country’s original
governing document, the Articles of Confederation, and was
seen as so deleterious that it was one of the driving forces

48. See infra notes 420–59 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 460–72 and accompanying text.
50. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
51. See supra note 5.
52. Donald H. Regan, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: How to Think
About the Federal Power and Incidentally to Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 554, 577 n.95 (1995) (“We know . . . that the main reason for giving
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was to allow Congress to
oversee state protectionist measures.”); Jesse H. Choper and Tung Yin, State
Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: the Object Measure Approach, 1998
SUP. CT. REV. 193, 199–200 (1998) (noting the “Dormant Commerce Clause’s core
prohibition of discrimination against interstate commerce.”). See generally
Fatale, supra note 7, at 52–55.
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resulting in the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. 53 The role
of the Commerce Clause is not limited to state taxation—the
Clause addresses such discriminatory action whether affected
by a state through the means of its tax law or through
regulatory action. 54 But importantly, the national government
was formed by state governments, and state sovereignty,
including the fundamental right of taxation, was specifically
intended to be retained under the U.S. Constitution. 55
To address states’ attempts at economic discrimination,
the Court, for much of its history, has attempted to distinguish
interstate from intrastate commerce and to restrict state
action with respect to the former, but not the latter. 56 At times,
these restrictions consisted of outright prohibitions upon the
states’ capacity to either tax or regulate interstate commerce. 57
These restrictions also sometimes consisted of attempts to
prohibit “direct” burdens as imposed upon interstate
commerce, as opposed to intrastate commerce. 58
53. See Paul J. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An
Appraisal and Suggested Approach, 3 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 234, 234 (1953) (“The
need for national economic unity unaffected by state borders and untrammeled
by discriminatory and retaliatory state action against commerce from sister
states was one of the chief reasons for abandonment of the Articles of
Confederation and the adoption of our Federal Constitution, by which Congress
was entrusted with the power to regulate interstate commerce.”); Fatale, supra
note 7, at 52–55.
54. See also Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (stating that under the dormant Commerce
Clause, “we have ruled that that Clause prohibits discrimination against
interstate commerce . . . and bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate
commerce.”) (emphasis added) (cites omitted). See Fatale, supra note 7, at 60.
55. See Fatale, supra note 7, at 42–44, 53.
56. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1995)
(discussing the analysis used by the Court and stating, inter alia, “[f]or nearly a
century [after Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, (1824)], the Court’s
Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress’ power,
and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that
discriminated against interstate commerce.”).
57. Hartman, supra note 53, at 234 (“In its zeal to preserve an unfettered flow
of interstate commerce, during most of our constitutional history, including the
present, the predominant doctrinal declaration of the Court has been an
adherence to the philosophy that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all by
the states.”). See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (“Our early cases, beginning with Brown
v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1827), swept broadly, and in Leloup v. Port of Mobile,
127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888), we declared that ‘no State has the right to lay a tax on
interstate commerce in any form.’ ” )
58. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309–10 (noting the use of the “direct”-”indirect”
test from late in the 1800’s until 1946); Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959) (“It has long been established doctrine
that the Commerce Clause gives exclusive power to the Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, and its failure to act on the subject in the area of taxation
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A significant problem with the Court’s early approach to
the Commerce Clause, which became exacerbated by
technological developments during the twentieth century, is
that it is not easy to delineate interstate from intrastate
commerce. 59 In its early cases, the Court equated intrastate
commerce with in-state “production, manufacturing, and
mining,” which tended to be localized, 60 and considered the
economic activities of persons crossing state lines, most
significantly sales persons, to represent interstate commerce. 61
This approach became increasingly difficult to implement
during the early to mid-1900’s as more and more businesses
became transient in their operations. 62

nevertheless requires that interstate commerce shall be free from any direct
restrictions or impositions by the States.”). See also Hartman, supra note 53, at
237 (noting early 20th century cases where “[t]he exactions were upheld on the
ground that they were levied on a ‘local incident’ or ‘local activity,’ or that the
burden of the tax on the commerce was ‘indirect’ or ‘incidental’ ” ).
59. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 236–37, 237 n.12 (noting cases where the
states were allowed to “pass statutes to safeguard their people from injurious
local effects that may attend interstate traffic, which nevertheless in some
measure affect interstate commerce”). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (noting the
Court’s early Commerce Clause cases where there were “difficult determinations”
because “the interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled
together”).
60. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (noting a long line of precedent beginning in
the 1800’s and proceeding into the 1900’s where “the Court held that [the
regulation of] certain categories of activity such as ‘production,’ ‘manufacturing,’
and ‘mining’ were within the province of state governments . . . under the
Commerce Clause.”); Hartman, supra note 53, at 244 (citing early 20th century
cases where the Court permitted “local governments to single out various ‘local’
events closely related to interstate commerce as the incidence of valid taxes . . .
such as [the] installation [and] maintenance of pipelines in the ground”).
61. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959) (noting that under the Court’s longstanding doctrine to prohibit
“direct” state burdens as imposed upon interstate commerce, a State could not
“impose taxes upon persons passing through the state, or coming into it merely
for a temporary purpose such as itinerant drummers”); Christopher D. Cameron
& Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome
Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 816 (1995)
(noting that in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), where
the company purposefully limited its state contacts to in-state sales persons, the
company argued as did most business litigants of the era that the “state had no
power to tax interstate commerce.”).
62. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753–54 (2014) (noting that in
the context of adjudicative jurisdiction the “territorial” presence requirement
adopted by the 1878 case, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) was eventually
abandoned in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
“spurred by changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and
the tremendous growth of interstate business activity.”) (quotes omitted);
Cameron and Johnson, supra note 61, at 800–03 (discussing select Supreme
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The Court’s attempt to forbid the states from imposing
taxes with respect to interstate commerce eventually raised
the prospect that the states would be foreclosed from taxing
most forms of commerce, as over time most forms of commerce
Problematically, this
included an interstate aspect. 63
consequence is potentially inconsistent with the Court’s
historic understanding that under the Constitution interstate
commerce can be made to pay its fair share of the states’ taxing
burden. 64 Also, over time the judicial determinations as to
whether a certain type of commercial activity constituted
interstate commerce became progressively more arbitrary. 65
In 1959, after several cases that trended in this direction, 66
the Court declared in Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota 67 that the states could impose income tax on
businesses that merely sent their sales personnel across state
lines. 68 Implicitly, this determination dispensed with the
Court due process cases in the years leading up to International Shoe).
63. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 53, at 252 (noting that, though the Court’s
view allowed for the taxation of “an event which is not part of interstate
commerce . . . [f]actually, of course, it is most difficult, if not impossible to find
such an event in modern multi-state business”).
64. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 n.15 (1977)
(stating that administrative inconvenience is not a basis for relieving multistate
taxpayers from their share of the states’ tax burden and that therefore “interstate
commerce may be made to pay its way”). See also Barclay’s Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994) (“The [Commerce] Clause does not
shield interstate (or foreign) commerce from its fair share of the tax burden”)
(quoting Department of Revenue v. Assoc. of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435
U.S. 734, 750 (1978); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 n.5 (1992)
(“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in
interstate commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though
it increases the cost of doing business”) (quoting Commonwealth Edison v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1981)). Commonwealth Edison, quoted in Quill,
in turn quoted from Western Livestock et al. v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250,
254 (1938). See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 623–24. See also
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 462 (1959)
(“It is axiomatic that the founders did not intend to immunize [interstate]
commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of that state government in
return for the benefits it derives from within the state.”).
65. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 244 (noting in a 1953 article that the
judicial determinations “for determining what events can be segregated [as local]
so as to serve as the fulcrum of the tax . . . [o]ftimes seem arbitrary.”)
66. See Portland Cement, 358 U.S. at 459-461 (citing cases).
67. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
68. 358 U.S. at 452. Portland Cement led to an Act of Congress, Public Law
86-272, that preempted the state imposition of a corporate net income tax on facts
similar to those in the case. For a detailed discussion of that development and
its history, see Michael T. Fatale, Federalism and State Business Activity Tax
Nexus: Revisiting Public Law 86-272, 21 VA. TAX REV. 435, 474–79 (2002).
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Court’s pre-existing distinction between intrastate and
interstate commerce. 69 Further, in 1961, the Court doubled
down on the result in Portland Cement and held in Scripto, Inc.
v. Carson 70 that a state could impose a use tax collection
obligation on a business whose only in-state contact was the
activity of sales representatives. 71 Scripto included the
important conclusion that it did not matter whether the instate sales representatives of the business were legally
employees of the business. 72 As to this latter point, the Court
sought to make clear that the terminology used by a business
as a matter of contract was not relevant to the analysis of the
business’ economic activity for state tax jurisdiction
purposes. 73
The question of whether a burden directly or indirectly
impacts interstate commerce raised similar interpretative
difficulties. The application of this rule in state tax cases often
came to turn upon the phrasing of the state’s taxing statute. 74
For example, under the direct-indirect principle, a state tax
would be struck down as unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause if it was imposed on the privilege of engaging in
business in the state since such a tax was deemed to be a direct
tax on interstate commerce. 75 Therefore this rule became more

69. See 358 U.S. at 452 (“We conclude that net income from the interstate
operations of a foreign corporation [i.e., generally sales solicitation and related
activities] may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not
discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing
State forming sufficient nexus to support the same.”). The Portland Cement
holding was predicated on both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process
Clause. See id.
70. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
71. Id. at 210–13.
72. Id. at 211 (“True, the ‘salesmen’ are not regular employees of appellant
devoting full time to its service, but we conclude that such a fine distinction is
without constitutional significance.”)
73. Id. (“The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as
‘independent’ neither results in changing his local function of solicitation nor
bears upon its effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida . . .
To permit such formal “ ‘ contractual shifts’ to make a constitutional difference
would open the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance.”) As in the case of Portland
Cement, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), see supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text,
Scripto was decided on both Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause grounds.
See infra notes 214–19 and accompanying text (discussing Scripto in the context
of the Court’s adjudicative jurisdiction cases).
74. See Quill, 298 U.S. at 310 (noting that the rule was one that attached
“constitutional significance to a semantic difference” in statutory wording).
75. See id. (noting that in Complete Auto, “[w]e expressly overruled . . .
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951), which held that a
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formal than pragmatic in its application. Recognizing this, the
Court disposed of the so-called “formal rule” in the 1977 case
of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 76
B. The Supreme Court’s Current Dormant Commerce
Clause Approach Focusing on Discrimination and Due
Process
Complete Auto became the bridge to the Court’s
contemporary Commerce Clause approach. Complete Auto
replaced the Court’s prior direct-indirect burden inquiry with
a four prong test that evaluates the legitimacy of a state tax. 77
One of those four prongs is an evaluation whether the state tax
is discriminatory 78—the inquiry that directly probes the
rationale embodied in the Commerce Clause. 79 The other three
prongs—the “substantial nexus” prong that evaluates state tax
jurisdiction and the two prongs that evaluate questions of
whether the tax is fairly apportioned and fairly related to
services provided by the state 80—do not directly probe the
Therefore, these latter three
discrimination question. 81
inquiries are more suspect as Commerce Clause principles. 82
tax on ‘the privilege of doing interstate business’ was unconstitutional, while
recognizing that a differently denominated tax with the same economic effect
would not be unconstitutional. Spector, as we [have] observed . . . created a
situation in which magic words or labels could disable an otherwise constitutional
levy.”) (cites omitted).
76. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309–10 (“Most recently, in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 285, we renounced [our prior] . . .
approach as attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference . . .
Complete Auto emphasized the importance of looking past “the formal language
of the tax statute [to] its practical effect”) (brackets added) (quoting Complete
Auto, 430 U. S. at 279). See also Fatale, supra note 7, at 59–60, 60 n.96
(discussing the demise of the “Formal Rule” in Complete Auto).
77. See generally 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
78. 430 U.S. at 279.
79. See Fatale supra note 7, at 60–61.
80. 430 U.S. at 279, 288.
81. See Choper & Yin, supra note 52, at 199 (“The central problem of Complete
Auto is that its four prongs are functionally overlapping and redundant in
attempting to fulfill the bedrock constitutional value serviced by judicial review
of state taxation of interstate commerce: nondiscrimination against interstate
commerce.”). See also Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction, 24 VA. TAX REV. 109, 114 (2004)
(“[T]he case for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause to impose a nexus
requirement with respect to state taxes is an uneasy one . . . [it] is unclear
whether the Commerce Clause itself says anything about these jurisdictional
requirements.”).
82. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 618 (1997) (Scalia, J., Thomas, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[O]ur
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Later Supreme Court cases have made clear that the three
non-discrimination prongs of Complete Auto generally embody
due process principles. 83
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has taken us well beyond the
invalidation of obviously discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce. We have
used the Clause to make policy-laden judgments that we are ill equipped and
arguably unauthorized to make.”); id. at 618–19 (Scalia, J., Thomas, J. and
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Complete Auto as an example of the Court’s
foray “beyond the invalidation of obviously discriminatory taxes” to “policy-laden
judgments” through the means of “multi factor tests in order to assess the
perceived ‘effect’ any particular state tax or regulation has on interstate
commerce.”).
The critiques of the dormant Commerce Clause in recent Supreme Court
dissents—largely those of Justices Scalia and Thomas, see, e.g., id.—have been
tacitly reflected, in part, in the Court’s majority decisions. A recent example is
the 2015 case, Comptroller v. Wynne, which applied the dormant Commerce
Clause to strike down an aspect of Maryland’s personal income tax on
discrimination grounds. 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). In Wynne, a 5-4 decision, the
majority specifically defended the dormant Commerce Clause against a challenge
by dissenting Justices Thomas and Scalia that the doctrine is not rooted in the
Constitution. Id. at 1806-07. But the majority’s defense referenced only the fact
that the dormant Commerce Clause serves to address state tax discrimination,
and, for example, made no mention of Complete Auto’s substantial nexus prong.
Id. The Wynne opinion does more generally reference the four prongs of Complete
Auto, but notably—particularly given the fact the majority did specifically
endeavor to defend the dormant Commerce Clause—only to observe that the
lower Maryland court had “evaluated the tax under the four-part test” of that
case. Id. at 1793. Although the lower Maryland court also struck down the tax
in part on fair apportionment grounds, id., the Supreme Court makes no mention
of “fair apportionment” in its analysis. See generally Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787. See
also infra note 156.
83. See, e.g., Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 373
(1991) (“The Complete Auto test[s], while responsive to Commerce Clause
dictates, encompas[s] as well the due process requirement that there be a
‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and
a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the
intrastate values of the enterprise.”); Amerada Hess Corp v. Director, 490 U.S.
66, 79–80 (1989) (noting that the “appellants recognize that the Complete Auto
test encompasses due process standards”). See also infra note 103-105 and
accompanying text (referencing language in MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Dep’t
of Revenue, 128 S.Ct. 1501 2008)); Joondeph, supra note 81, at 132 (stating that
the nexus requirement that the Court has posited under the dormant Commerce
Clause in fact has its basis elsewhere in the Constitution “perhaps [as] an
essential premise of our federal system [or perhaps as a requirement of] the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; or perhaps both” . . . and that
“attributing this nexus requirement to the dormant Commerce Clause seems both
unnecessary and misconceived.”); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce
Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and State Taxation: An Analysis in
Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 Wayne L. Rev. 885, 919 (1985) (the “only
element of [the Complete Auto] approach that properly finds itself its source in
the negative Commerce Clause . . . is the nondiscrimination element, the other
three elements involve due process considerations.”); John A. Swain, State Income
Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 Wm. & Mary L.
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1. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 84 and the Application of
Due Process Principles in Later State Corporate
Income Tax and Sales Tax Cases
The development of the Due Process Clause as a
jurisdictional standard in state tax cases relative to the
application of the Commerce Clause was put to the test in the
1992 case, Quill v. North Dakota. 85 Quill fostered the
application of due process principles in the context of the
states’ corporate income taxes, while stunting the use of those
principles in the context of the states’ sales and use taxes. 86
However, even in the context of the states’ sales and use taxes,
Quill left an important role for due process principles to play. 87
Some historical background helps to understand the due
process jurisprudential impact of Quill. As commercial
technology continued to advance in the later part of the
twentieth century, a significant question emerged as to
whether a business could become subject to tax through its instate sales or income-producing activity where the contacts of
the out-of-state business did not require in-state facilities or
sales representatives. An example of this question was
resolved in the 1967 case Bellas Hess v. Illinois Department of
Revenue, 88 where the Court concluded that a mail order
business could not be subject to a state’s use tax collection duty
based merely upon the business’s in-state contacts of mail and
common carrier (i.e., that some in-state property interest or
representational activity was necessary). 89 The Court justified
its rule in Bellas Hess on both Commerce Clause and Due
Process Clause grounds. 90
In Quill, 91 the Court revisited its prior decision in Bellas
Hess in part because of questions whether the case had become
economically outdated or continued to reflect the Court’s then-

Rev. 319, 328, 328 n.34 (2003) (noting that in the Court’s prior cases leading up
to Complete Auto “the nexus, fair apportionment, and fairly related prongs of the
[Complete Auto] test were often rooted in due process rather than dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.”).
84. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
85. Id.
86. See infra notes 99–147 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 116–47 and accompanying text.
88. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
89. Id. at 758.
90. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
91. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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The Court
current state tax constitutional doctrine. 92
suggested that, given the advances in its jurisprudential logic,
it would not have reached the conclusion in Bellas Hess if the
question in that case was a matter of first impression. 93 But
the Court retained the holding in Bellas Hess on the basis of
stare decisis, particularly because it presumed that later
growth in the mail order industry may have been due in part
to the holding in that earlier case. 94 Also, the Court feared that
revocation of the rule from Bellas Hess would result in the
practical consequence that mail order companies would be
made to pay a large amount of retroactive tax. 95
The Court in Quill suggested that, although it had
modernized its state tax jurisdiction analysis after Bellas Hess,
it was now taking a step backwards. 96 The Court re-affirmed
92. 504 U.S. at 303–04 (the North Dakota decision that the Court reviewed
had refused to apply the holding in Bellas Hess because “wholesale changes in
both the economy and the law made it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess today”)
(citing North Dakota v. Quill, 470 N. W. 2d 203, 213, 208 (N.D. 1991). See also
infra notes 93 and 96 and accompanying text.
93. The Court stated, for example, that “Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, in
the middle of [the Court’s shifting its Commerce Clause analysis] between
formalism and pragmatism,” id. at 310; that “contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the
first time today”, id. at 311, that the rule in the case was “artificial around the
edges,” id. at 315, and that a similar rule had not been applied by the Court in
any other instances, id. at 318. The three Justices who filed a concurring opinion
in Quill—who are the three Justices who took part in the case that continue to
sit on the Court—stated that they would “not revisit the merits of [Bellas Hess],
but would adhere to [the holding in that case] on the basis of stare decisis.” 504
U.S. at 298, 319 (Scalia, J., Thomas, J. and Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy, one of the three concurring Justices, recently stated that “the Quill
majority acknowledged the prospect that its conclusion was wrong when the case
was decided.” Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 317 (noting that “the Bellas Hess rule has engendered
substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable
industry”); id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with this statement and
noting that “the demands of the [stare decisis] doctrine are at their acme . . .
where reliance interests are involved”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See
also id. at 316 (“it is not unlikely that the mail-order industry’s dramatic growth
over the last quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from state
taxation created in Bellas Hess”). See also Fatale, supra note 7, at 85.
95. Id. at 318 (noting that if it were to reverse the holding in Bellas Hess, the
likely result would be “retroactive application” of the taxes in question resulting
in “substantial unanticipated liability for mail order houses”). See Fatale, supra
note 7, at 86, 86 n.267. Retroactive imposition of a sales or use tax collection duty
can be particularly harsh, given that there is generally no longer any practical
ability to collect the tax from the purchaser from whom the tax was initially due.
96. For example, the Court commented on the analysis in the state court
decision it was reviewing, which had concluded that the Court’s rulings since
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its anachronistic holding in Bellas Hess in part on the theory
that Congress was better suited to address the questions
presented—a result that the Court specifically invited. 97 To
facilitate this result, the Court explicitly based its decision on
Commerce Clause grounds, and stated that it was no longer
justified on Due Process Clause grounds, thus clearly enabling
Congress to reconsider the rule. 98
a. Due Process and the Corporate Income Tax
Even as the Court in Quill was removing the due process
component from the state sales tax nexus analysis with the
specific goal of eliciting Congressional action, the Court
suggested that due process principles remained significant as
a state tax jurisprudential tool. The Court observed that
claims concerning the application of the Commerce Clause and
Due Process Clause in matters of state tax jurisdiction are
“closely related.” 99 The Court stated that the two clauses
impose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the states, but
suggested that those distinctions are not meaningful when
evaluating a nexus question outside the realm of sales tax. 100
Bellas Hess had retreated from the formalistic logic of that case; Quill stated that,
although it would re-affirm the holding in Bellas Hess, “it agreed with the state
court’s assessment of the evolution of our cases.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 314. See
generally Fatale, supra note 7, at 84–85.
97. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318, 320 (Scalia, J. concurring). See also Walter
Hellerstein, Supreme Court Says No State Use Tax Imposed on Mail Order
Sellers, For Now, 77 J. TAX’N 120, 123–24 (1992) (stating that the Court’s
language may have been intended, as a practical matter, to elicit a Congressional
response). Congress, however, has not acted. See infra notes 420-426 and
accompanying text. In hindsight, it seems apparent the Court would have been
more likely to elicit a Congressional response had it ruled for the state—similar
to the events that led to the enactment of Public Law 86-272. See supra note 68
and accompanying text.
98. 504 U.S. at 308 (“Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated
that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the
imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded
by developments in the law of due process.”); id. at 318 (noting that Congress may
have previously refrained from requiring mail order vendor to collect sales tax
because it thought that “the Due Process Clause prohibit[ed] States from
imposing such taxes”).
99. Id. at 305 (stating that in a number of cases involving jurisdictional
claims by out-of-state sellers, the Court’s holdings have relied on both the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause; that “[d]ue process and commerce
clause conceptions are not always sharply separable in dealing with
[jurisdictional] problems;” and that therefore the Court has “not always been
precise in distinguishing between the two [Clauses]”) (quotes omitted).
100. Id. Quill referenced three examples of differences between the Clauses,
none of which are typically relevant when a court evaluates state tax jurisdiction
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The Court also clarified that it had not established a
comparable “physical presence” rule that applies outside the
context of a state’s sales tax. 101 Therefore, the Court suggested
that state corporate income tax nexus should be determined by
applying due process principles. 102 In the 2008 corporate
income tax case, MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of
Revenue, 103 the Court acknowledged differences between the
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause, but stated “[t]he
broad inquiry subsumed in both constitutional requirements is
‘whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal
relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the
state’—that is, ‘whether the state has given anything for which

in the context of a corporate income tax. One example of a difference between the
two Clauses is that under the Commerce Clause, unlike under the Due Process
Clause, a court may strike down a state tax as discriminatory—a prospect that is
not typically implicated when a state seeks to impose its tax jurisdiction. See id.
at 305 (citing the Court’s prior decision in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v.
Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), and noting that case
represented a situation where “while a State may, consistent with the Due
Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the
tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause”). In Tyler Pipe, a taxpayer
was held subject to a state’s tax, whereas other taxpayers were able to show that
the state’s taxing methodology was unconstitutionally discriminatory as applied
to them. See 482 U.S. at 253. See also Fatale, supra note 7, at 63, 63 n.113 (citing
recent Supreme Court discrimination cases, none of which involved a nexus
claim). A second example of a distinction between the two Constitutional clauses
is that the Commerce Clause, unlike the Due Process Clause, has a broad
affirmative aspect that authorizes Congress to generally regulate as to the
national economy, including with respect to state taxes. See id. at 318 (noting
Congress’s ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause with respect to state
taxation). And of course, third, Quill itself created a practical distinction between
the two clauses in the context of sales tax, by re-affirming the Court’s prior
“physical presence” rule from National Bellas Hess, and justifying the rule on
Commerce Clause but not due process grounds. See generally id. at 306–18.
101. Id. at 314 (“we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated
the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales
and use taxes”) and 317 (“in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning
other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence
requirement”).
102. See Choper & Yin, supra note 52, at 202 (noting that although Quill
purports to differentiate the “substantial nexus” prong of Complete Auto from the
Due Process minimum contacts requirement, it provides no guidance as to the
difference); Swain, supra note 83, at 342 (stating that the ruling in Quill that a
taxpayer’s jurisdictional nexus with the state must include a Commerce Clause
dimension as well as a Due Process dimension “makes it difficult to know how to
fill Commerce Clause nexus with content” as “[m]ost of the nexus ‘burdens’ that
come to mind are also due process concerns: notice, forseeability, fundamental
fairness, and the like”).
103. 128 S. Ct. 1501 (2008).
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it can ask return.’ ” 104 This reference was to the Court’s
longstanding due process inquiry as applied in state tax cases
evaluating the breadth of the states’ taxing powers. 105
In the aftermath of Quill, a series of state tax cases upheld
the imposition of a corporate income tax in whole or in part on
the theory that no physical presence standard applies to such
taxes. 106 Instead of applying the physical presence test, the
104. 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S.
307, 315 (1982), in turn quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940)). Meadwestvaco pertained to a question of corporate income tax
apportionment and not nexus, but the Court analogized between the two
inquiries, stating that both evaluate the states’ ability “to tax extraterritorial
values.” Id. at 1502. See also id. (“The Commerce Clause and the Due Process
Clause impose distinct but parallel limitations on a State’s power to tax out-ofstate activities.”); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768,
778 (1992) (stating that in nexus and apportionment questions, the Court is
“guided by the basic principle that the State’s power to tax an individual’s or
corporation’s activities is justified by the protection, opportunities and benefits
the State confers on those activities.”).
105. See Fatale, supra note 7, at 84 and n.252–53. See also infra note 104 and
accompanying text (citing Court cases with similar language).
106. Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13,18 (S.C.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993) (nexus found with respect to an out-ofstate corporation engaged in in-state licensing of trademarks to a related party);
Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., 131 P.3d 27, 39 (N.M. Ct. App.
2001), writ quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005) (same); A&F Trademark, Inc. v.
Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 821 (2005)
(same); Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176, 176 (N.J.
2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007) (same); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632, 638 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (same); Bridges v. Geoffrey,
Inc., 984 So.2d 115, 128 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2008), writ denied, 978 S.2d 370 (La.
2008) (same); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 453 Mass. 17 (2009), cert.
denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4584 (2009) (same); Tax Comm’r v. MBNA America
Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 232, 234 (W.Va. 2006), cert. denied, FIA Card
Services, N.A. v. Tax Comm’r, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007) (nexus found with respect to
an out-of-state corporation engaged in in-state credit card lending); Capital One
Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 453 Mass. 1, 15 (2009), cert. denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS
4616 (2009) (same); MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Indiana Dep’t of State
Revenue, 895 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2008) (same); KFC Corp v. Iowa Dept
of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 322, 328 (Iowa 2010) cert. denied, 2011 WL 4530160
(2011) (nexus found with respect to an out-of-state corporation engaged in
licensing trademarks and related intangible property to unrelated in-state
franchisees). See also Borden Chemicals and Plastics v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73,
80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), app. denied, 731 N.E.2d 762 (Ill. 2000) (court states there
is no physical presence requirement outside the context of sales and use tax; finds
non-resident corporate partner that owns a partnership interest in a partnership
doing business in the state is subject to the state’s corporate income tax); Couchot
v. State Lottery Comm., 74 Ohio St. 3d 417, 424–25 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
810 (1996) (court states there is no physical presence requirement outside the
context of sales and use tax; finds non-resident lottery ticket winners are subject
to the state’s personal income tax); Gen. Motors Corp. v City of Seattle, 25 P.3d
1022, 1029 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), pet. rev. denied en banc, 84 P.3d 1230 (Wash.
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focus of these courts was whether the taxpayer was doing
business in the state or was otherwise significantly exploiting
the state’s economic market or its resources. 107 Therefore,
although the cases were evaluated under the Commerce
Clause, the logic resembled due process analysis. 108 Several of
the cases suggested that the state tax jurisdictional standard
might require a certain threshold of in-state activity 109—a
higher level of contacts than is typically required in non-tax
adjudicative jurisdiction cases. 110 But this general line of
analysis focusing on in-state market exploitation is

2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002) (court states there is no physical
presence requirement outside the context of sales and use tax; finds corporation
engaged in wholesale sales activity with respect to in-state car retailers subject
to the state’s gross receipts tax).
Two cases are sometimes cited as representing a contrary holding: Rylander
v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App. 2000) and J.C. Penney Nat’l
Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 927
(2000). For a critique of the notion that these cases are in fact to the contrary,
see Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632, 638 (2005) and Bridges
v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So.2d 115, 127 (2008). See also KFC Corp, 792 N.W.2d at
322 (distinguishing Bandag); Geoffrey, 453 Mass. at 24 (same); Capital One, 453
Mass. at 13 n.16 (noting that the logic in J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank was later
questioned by the same court that decided the case in America Online, Inc. v.
Johnson, No. M2001-00927 COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2002)).
107. See generally the cases cited at supra note 106. See Michael T. Fatale,
State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical ‘Physical Presence’ Constitutional
Standard, 54 TAX LAWYER 105, 111–16, 142 (2000).
108. See generally the cases cited at supra note 106.
109. See KFC Corp., 792 N.W.2d at 328 (“When a company earns hundreds of
thousands of dollars from sales to Iowa customers arising from the licensing of
intangibles associated with the fast-food business, we conclude that the Supreme
Court would engage in a realistic substance-over-form assessment that would
allow a state legislature to require the payment of the company’s fair share of
taxes without violating the dormant Commerce Clause”); Capital One Bank, 453
Mass. at 15–16 (finding nexus where the out-of-state banks “were soliciting and
conducting significant credit card business in the Commonwealth with hundreds
of thousands of Massachusetts residents, generating millions of dollars in income
for the . . . banks”); MBNA America Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 235 (“[A]n entity’s
exploitation of the market must be greater in degree than under the Due Process
standard so that its economic presence can be characterized as significant or
substantial”). See also Alan B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic
Nexus, 13 FL. TAX. REV. 157, 181–87 (2012) (evaluating state statutes that assert
corporate income tax jurisdiction based upon a taxpayer’s purposeful exploitation
of the state’s economic market, including those that require a certain threshold
of in-state sales).
110. See Thimmesch, supra note 109, at 181, 187, 187 n.179 (referring to
“heightened” state corporate income tax nexus standards that require in-state
“market exploitation” or a “level of economic connection” that exceeds the
“minimum connections required by the Due Process Clause or the simple
derivation of revenue from a state.”).
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nonetheless consistent with due process principles. 111
While the Supreme Court has never affirmed the result in
any of the various corporate income tax nexus cases that were
decided in favor of the states post-Quill, the Court has
repeatedly denied taxpayer petitions for a writ of certiorari in
these cases. 112 The denial of such a petition does not constitute
a judicial precedent, 113 but these continued denials nonetheless
seem legally meaningful. The re-affirmation of Bellas Hess in
Quill was based in part on the Court’s concern for the financial
well-being of mail order vendors that reasonably relied upon
Bellas Hess, including the concern that these vendors would
otherwise be forced to pay large amounts of retroactive
taxes. 114 Similarly, the state courts concluding that Quill’s
holding is limited to sales and use tax have also relied upon
prior language of the Court, as stated in Quill. If the Court
reversed the results in these state tax cases twenty-plus years
after Quill there would be significant retroactive revenue
consequences to the states. 115
b. Due Process and the Sales Tax
Quill dispensed with what would have been the otherwise
applicable due process inquiry in sales tax nexus cases in favor
of a Commerce Clause physical presence standard. 116 The
Court concluded, as in its prior case, Bellas Hess, 117 that a mail
order vendor engaged in substantial in-state market

111. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (“[s]o long as a commercial actor’s efforts
are purposefully directed toward residents of another State”—for example,
through “continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State”. . .
such actor “clearly has fair warning that its activity may subject it to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”) (quotes omitted).
112. See the cases referenced supra note 106.
113. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 85 (1995).
114. See supra notes 94–95.
115. See Joe Huddleston, MTC Supports Economic Presence Standards for
Businesses, St. Tax Today, May 11, 2012 (noting an estimate of the Congressional
Budget Office that a federal law preempting the jurisdictional standard applied
in these state tax cases would cost the states about $2 billion in the first year of
enactment and at least that much in subsequent years). Cf. United Haulers Ass’n
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342–43 (2007)
(“Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with the responsibility of
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. . . . These important
responsibilities set state and local government apart from a typical private
business.”).
116. 504 U.S. at 317–18.
117. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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exploitation 118 could not be held subject to the state’s use tax
collection duty based merely upon the “non-physical” in-state
contacts of mail and common carrier. 119 In the aftermath of
Quill, the application of this physical presence standard was
clear on facts that substantially resembled the facts evaluated
in Quill, but often unclear otherwise. 120
One fundamental difficulty with applying the Quill
physical presence standard to a corporation making sales into
a state is that a corporation is a mere legal construct that has
no inherent physical attributes. 121 Therefore, any question
probing a corporation’s physical presence first requires a
determination as to what in-state representational acts or
property of that corporation can create physical presence. 122 In
such cases, whether the standard is met logically depends on
the “quality and the nature” of the corporation’s contacts in
relation to the purposes that underlie the Quill physical
presence rule. 123 Since Quill was primarily intended to protect
mail order vendors that had reasonably relied upon the Court’s
prior holding in Bellas Hess, 124 the physical presence rule of

118. The company made almost $1 million in annual in-state sales to about
3,000 customers in the state. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302. These sales were the result
of 24 tons of catalogs and flyers mailed by the company into the state every year.
Id. at 502.
119. This was “the Bellas Hess rule” upheld by the Court. See Quill, 504 U.S.
at 311, 317–18. See also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
120. See Fatale, supra note 107, at 118–30. See also Buehner Block Co. v. Wyo.
Dep’t of Revenue, 139 P.3d 1150, 1158 (Wyo. 2006) (“the bright-line rule [of Quill]
simply holds that, where there is no physical presence in a state, and the only
connection between the state and the entity or transaction is by mail or common
carrier, there is no “substantial nexus” that will support imposition of a sales or
use tax . . . . While mail or common carrier delivery, alone, cannot support a state’s
taxing authority, neither does the existence of either of those factors, ipso facto,
prohibit the imposition of a [sales or use] tax. Instead, determining the existence
or non-existence of “substantial nexus” is a fact-driven inquiry, different in each
case.”).
121. Acknowledgement of this general point ushered in the Court’s modern
due process jurisprudence, beginning with International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text.
122. A substantially similar question formed the basis for the Court’s seminal
due process case, International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See
infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text.
123. Cf. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (“Whether due process is satisfied
must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure.”); Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211-212 (1960) (the
constitutional “test” for jurisdiction “is simply the nature and extent of the
activities” of the corporation in the state).
124. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 (noting that the case applied, as in Bellas Hess, to
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Quill should be applied to effectuate that purpose. 125 Applying
Quill to protect the reasonable reliance interests of taxpayers
has the effect of applying due process-like fairness principles
to determine whether the taxpayer has met the physical
presence test. 126
State sales tax cases decided post-Quill are generally
consistent with this analysis. For example, Quill was decided
at a time when the Internet was not yet widely used to make
retail sales, and therefore such vendors were not within the
specific class that the Court sought to protect. Nonetheless, it
is generally understood that when a vendor’s contacts with a
state are limited to direct sales solicitation through the
Internet and product deliveries by common carrier, the Quill
safe harbor should apply. 127 Similarly, it is not the case that
every in-state representational activity or property interest
will establish sales tax physical presence nexus. 128 Most state
a state’s attempt to apply a use tax collection duty to “an out-of-state mail-order
house . . . whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier
or the United States mail.”); 315 (“under Bellas Hess, such vendors are free from
state-imposed duties to collect sales and use taxes”); and 317–18 (concluding that
the “Bellas Hess rule remains good law” and that it is not “time . . . to renounce
the bright-line test of Bellas Hess”).
125. See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation, ¶ 19.02[3][b] (3d ed. 2011) (Supp.
No. 3 2010) (“Many of the reasons the Court advanced for adhering to the
physical-presence standard relate principally, if not exclusively, to sales and use
taxes on the mail-order industry. . . . Quill, therefore, may arguably be read to
have established a ‘bright-line’ physical-presence standard only for sales and use
taxes on the mail-order industry alone.”) (quoted in Adam Thimmesch, The
Fading Bright Line of Physical Presence: Did KFC Corporation v. Iowa
Department of Revenue Give States the Secret Recipe for Repudiating Quill?, 100
KY. L.J. 339, 350 n.88 (2012)). See also Buehner Block Co., 139 P.3d at 1158 (Wyo.
2006) (applying sales tax to a remote vendor that shipped purchased concrete
blocks to the state by common carrier and that lacked any other physical contacts
with the state where the vendor had previously obtained a state sales tax vendor
license and was collecting sales tax on similar in-state transactions).
126. Cf. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (“Due process centrally concerns the
fundamental fairness of governmental activity . . . We have, therefore, often
identified ‘notice’ or ‘fair warning’ as the analytic touchstone of due process nexus
analysis.”).
127. See Fatale, supra note 107, at 106.
128. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 302 n.1, 315 n.8 (noting that the in-state license of
software included on “three floppy disks” resulted in an in-state presence that
was a mere “slightest presence” and therefore insufficient to establish state tax
nexus). Compare Texas CPA Hearing No. 106,632, Docket No. 304-13-5657.26
(Tex. Cptr. Pub Acct. Sept. 19, 2014) (electronic licenses of vendor software and
digital images downloaded in the state is conceded to constitute “tangible
personal property” under state law and, where the volume of such sales is
significant, held to exceed a mere slightest presence therefore establishing state
tax nexus on the part of the vendor).

588

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:55

courts have assumed in factually difficult cases that the nature
and extent of the contacts must be considered. 129 Using this
approach, state courts generally conclude that where a
vendor’s in-state “physical” presence exceeds a mere “slightest”
presence, those contacts are sufficient to establish sales tax
nexus, particularly if the in-state contacts assist in the
vendor’s generation of significant in-state sales. 130
Scripto v. Carson, Inc. 131 and Tyler Pipe v. Wash. Dept. of
Rev., 132 two Supreme Court cases decided prior to Quill, assist
in the sales tax nexus analysis. Those cases establish that
certain in-state activities of an independent contractor will
establish “physical presence” sales tax nexus on the part of a
corporation. Scripto held that independent sales persons can
establish nexus on the part of an out-of-state vendor and
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would permit vendors
using salaried sales representatives to engage in tax avoidance
by instead using independent representatives. 133 Tyler Pipe
similarly determined that sales tax nexus was established
based on in-state sales-related activity performed by

129. See, e.g., Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 86 N.Y.2d 165, 179–
80 (1995) (nexus found where taxpayer representatives made only 12 visits to the
state in 3 years that were “systematic”—with each visit resulting in meetings
with up to 19 wholesale customers who during the 3-year period were responsible
for about 15% of the company’s total in-state sales); Arizona Dept. of Revenue v.
Care Computer Systems, Inc., 4 P.3d 469, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (nexus
determined based on the “volume” and “nature” of the taxpayer’s in-state
activity). See also Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. at 211–12 (1960) (finding sales tax
nexus applying a test that “is simply the nature and extent of the [in-state]
activities of the [taxpayer]”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945) (“Whether due process is satisfied [in a case pertaining to adjudicative
jurisdiction] must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity.”); KFC
Corp. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 314 (2008) (stating in the context
of a corporate income tax case that the Supreme Court’s “dormant Commerce
Clause nexus requirement . . . has emphasized a flexible approach based on
economic reality and the nature of the activity giving rise to the income that the
state seeks to tax”).
130. See, e.g., Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 654 N.E.2d 954, 960–
61 (N.Y. 1995) (the taxpayer’s presence need only “be demonstrably more than a
slightest presence”) (internal quotes omitted); Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner,
665 N.E.2d 795, 803 (1996) (holding that the taxpayer had “established more than
a slight physical presence within the [s]tate”); Magnetek Controls, 562 N.W.2d,
219, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (“tax obligations may be imposed, consistent with
the Commerce Clause, on taxpayers with demonstrably more than a slightest
presence in a state”) (internal quotes omitted). See also infra note 128 (citing
cases evaluating the “slightest presence” nexus standard).
131. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
132. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
133. 362 U.S. at 210–11.
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independent contractors. 134 Tyler Pipe stated, “the crucial
factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in
this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated
with the taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market
in this state for the sales.” 135
Although helpful, the decisions in Scripto and Tyler Pipe
do not always clearly resolve the nexus analysis in particular
cases, 136 thus creating the need to also consider the taxpayer’s
reasonable reliance interests vis-à-vis Quill. New York State’s
highest court provided an often-cited restatement of the
applicable sales tax nexus standard in Orvis Co. v. Tax
Tribunal 137—that sales tax nexus can be established “by the
presence in the taxing State of the vendor’s property or the
conduct of economic activities in the taxing State performed by
the vendor’s personnel or on its behalf.” 138 However, the Orvis
re-formulation of the applicable nexus test also begs the
question in some cases as to what particular property interests
or economic activities will suffice. 139
Recent state cases have extended Scripto and Tyler Pipe to
find sales tax nexus where unrelated in-state persons solicited
or enhanced sales on behalf of an out-of-state vendor for
consideration when the in-state person or persons: (1)

134. 483 U.S. at 251.
135. Id. at 250. See also 482 U.S. at 249 (noting that “[t]he sales
representatives acted daily on behalf of Tyler Pipe in calling on its customers and
soliciting orders. They have long-established and valuable relationships with
Tyler Pipe’s customers. Through sales contacts, the representatives maintain and
improve the name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer
relations of Tyler Pipe.”).
136. See, e.g., Scholastic Books Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 38 A.3d 1183,
1199 (Conn. 2012) (“We first observe that the language in Bellas Hess and Quill
describing Scripto as representing the [Supreme Court’s] ‘furthest’ extension of
the state’s taxing power was no more than an observation concerning the state of
the law at that time, and was not necessarily intended to mean that a substantial
nexus between the out-of-state retailer and the state could not be found in other,
as of yet undefined, circumstances.”) (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 306); Orvis Co., 654
N.E.2d at 185 (noting the Supreme Court’s statement in Scripto v. Carson that
its holding in that case “represents the furthest constitutional reach to date of a
State’s power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection agent for a use
tax” and stating “[w]e believe that the instant cases go ‘further’ ” ) (citing Quill,
504 U.S. at 306).
137. 86 N.Y.2d 165 (1995).
138. Id. at 178. See Borders Online v. State Bd. Of Equaliz., 29 Cal.Rptr.3d
176, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citing this standard); Fatale, supra note 107, at 120
n.100 (citing cases that have relied upon this standard).
139. See generally the cases referenced supra note 138.
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facilitated sales but were not professional sales persons, 140 (2)
received commissions based on completed sales that resulted
from a referral from the person’s Internet website, 141 or (3)
performed ancillary sales activity for the vendor, such as the
performance of warranty work 142 or in-state product delivery
and installation. 143
The logic in Tyler Pipe was also recently extended to a fact
pattern in which separately incorporated in-state bookstores
engaged in “cross-marketing”—including through the shared
use of trademarks—with an out-of-state affiliated vendor that
was making similar in-state Internet sales. 144 Although state
140. See, e.g., Scholastic Books Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 38 A.3d 1183,
1199 (Conn. 2012) (school teachers facilitating in-state sales on behalf of out-ofstate bookseller); Scholastic Books Clubs, Inc. v. Farr, 373 S.W.3d 558, 564–65
(Tenn. 2012) (same). Similar earlier cases reached mixed conclusions. See
Fatale, supra note 107, at 125–27.
141. See Overstock.com, LLC v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation and
Finance, 20 N.Y.3d 586 (2013), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 8648 (2013) (tax
jurisdiction established for out-of-state Internet vendor based on an “Associates
Program” through which in-state third parties agreed to place links on their own
websites that, when clicked, directed users to the vendor’s website; the Associates
were compensated by commissions determined based on clicks and subsequent
online purchases); Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Dep’t of Tax and
Finance, 20 N.Y. 3d 586 (2013) (same), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 8717 (2013).
The court noted that the in-state persons were “not merely engaged to post
passive advertisements on their websites,” but rather were paid to “actively
solicit business in this state.” Id. at 596.
142. See Dell Catalog Sales L.P. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 199 P.3d 863
(N.M. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1616 (2009). See also Robert D. Plattner,
Daniel Smirlock, & Mary Ellen Ladouceur, A New Way Forward for Remote
Vendor Sales Tax Collection, STATE TAX TODAY, (Jan. 18, 2010), at 194 (citing the
2008 New Mexico Dell case as an example of the circumstance that “under some
fact patterns, states could appropriately assert nexus over an out-of-state seller
based on a combination of the in-state activities of an ‘independent company’
providing services to tangible personal property purchased from the out-of-state
seller, and the nature of the relationship between the out-of-state seller and instate service provider”).
143. See Town Crier, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 733 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000); Furnitureland South v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-97-37872 OC
(Md. Cir. Ct August 13, 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 771 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2001).
See also Arco Bldg. Systems, Inc. v. Chumley, 209 S.W.3d 63, 74-75 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2006), appeal denied, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1002 (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2006) (nexus
found with respect to out-of-state vendor that sold buildings in the state based
upon the in-state activities of unrelated parties that manufactured and delivered
the buildings).
144. Barnesandnoble.com LLC, 303 P.3d 824, 825 (N.M. 2013). See Borders
Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(similar). Barnesandnoble.com specifically relied upon the fact that Tyler Pipe
had reasoned that an in-state contractor’s activities could establish nexus on the
part of a remote vendor when those activities operated to enhance the vendor’s
“name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer relations.”
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courts have generally concluded that there is no physical
presence nexus standard that applies to the states’ corporate
income tax, two state cases have similarly concluded that instate trademark licensing activity can establish corporate
income tax nexus, in part because the resulting incomegenerating activity results in the functional equivalent of
physical presence. 145
Scripto and Tyler Pipe have also been recently applied to
a corporation not otherwise present in the state that booked instate hotel reservations through its website for a fee. 146 The
court’s reasoning was that the services provided by the
unrelated in-state hotels that contracted with the corporation
were “significantly associated with [the company’s] ability to
establish and maintain a market [in the state] for its sales.” 147

Barnesandnoble.com LLC, 303 P.3d at 827, 829. See Plattner, et al., supra note
142, at 194-195 (discussing this general fact pattern). See also Harley-Davidson,
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 237 Cal. App. 4th 193, 218 (2015). (corporate income
tax case states that under Tyler Pipe “the third party’s in-state conduct need not
be sales related; it need only be an integral and crucial aspect of the business”)
(quotes omitted).
145. See KFC Corp v. Iowa Dept of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 324 (2010) cert.
denied, 2011WL 4530160 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court would likely find
intangibles owned by KFC, but utilized in a fast-food business by its franchisees
that are firmly anchored within the state, would be regarded as having a
sufficient connection to Iowa to amount to the functional equivalent of ‘physical
presence’ under Quill); Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., 131 P.3d
27, 39 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), writ quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005) (“Considering
the Quill standard in the context of this case, we conclude that the combination
of Kmart Corporation’s activities in New Mexico, together with the tangible
presence of KPI’s marks, constitutes the functional equivalent of physical
presence as afforded by the independent representatives in Scripto and Tyler
Pipe.”). See also supra note 106 (citing additional cases that have found corporate
income tax nexus based upon the in-state licensing of intangible property);
Borden Chems. and Plastics v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(court states there is no physical presence requirement outside the context of
sales tax such that a non-resident corporate partner is subject to the state’s
income tax, but also concludes that such a partner of a partnership doing business
in the state would meet a physical presence standard; court notes also that
“Illinois has afforded protection and benefits to the Operating Partnership’s
activities and transactions within the state and that these services provided by
Illinois have helped give rise to the income that is distributed to [the partner]
plaintiff”).
146. Travelscape v. South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, 391 S.C. 89 (S.C. 2011).
147. Id. at 106-107. See also Travelocity.com v. Wyoming Dep’t of Revenue,
329 P.3d 131, 148-150 (Wyo. 2014) (similar). See also City of Charleston v.
Hotels.com, 586 F.Supp. 2d 538, 544 (2008) (stating the court has “no hesitation
in ruling” that the physical presence rule does not apply since the online travel
companies “are alleged to have proactively booked and leased hotel rooms and
other accommodations that are physically located [in the state].”).
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2. Discrimination and the Evaluation of State Tax
Burdens Post-Quill Corp. v. North Dakota 148
Complete Auto replaced the Court’s prior Commerce
Clause test for evaluating the legitimacy of a state tax, the
direct-indirect burdens inquiry, with four tests—one that
probes discrimination and three that generally evaluate due
process principles. 149 Therefore, one consequence of Complete
Auto in state tax cases has been not only to dispense with the
Court’s previous direct-indirect burdens test, but also to
dispense with the general consideration of taxpayer burdens of
any type. This is because the consideration of such burdens, to
the extent such questions remain relevant, are now subsumed
under the three non-discrimination prongs of Complete Auto,
which focus on whether a state tax meets due process fairness
concerns. 150 Consistent with this point, when the Court in
Quill re-affirmed the “physical presence” rule established by
Bellas Hess, it reasoned that this rule—an interpretation of
Complete Auto’s first, nexus prong—served to address the
potential prospect of an “undue” taxpayer burden. 151 The
Court’s suggestion was that outside this “bright line”
standard—and the Complete Auto prongs more generally—
there is to be no independent, general consideration of such
burdens. 152
In 1995, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson
Lines, 153 the Supreme Court upheld a states sale tax that was
challenged as imposing an “undue tax burden” because the

148. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
149. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266,
291 (1987) (“[W]hen the measure of a tax bears no relationship to the taxpayers’
presence or activities in a State, a court may properly conclude under the fourth
prong of the Complete Auto Transit test that the State is imposing an undue
burden on interstate commerce.”). See also supra notes 80–83 and accompanying
text.
151. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (noting that “undue burdens . . . may be avoided . . .
by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from
interstate taxation. . . [like the Bellas Hess] safe harbor for vendors whose only
connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or the
United States mail.”) (internal quotes omitted). See also id. at 313 (“The first and
fourth prongs [of Complete Auto] . . . limit the reach of state taxing authority so
as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce); id.
at 325 (White, J., dissenting) (“parts two and three of the Complete Auto test . . .
[ensure] that interstate commerce not be unduly burdened”).
152. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
153. 514 U.S. 179 (1995).
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Court concluded that the tax complied with each of Complete
Auto’s four prongs. 154 Since 1995, the Court has taken several
cases that have probed state tax discrimination within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause. 155 However, only one case,
a fair apportionment case that was later dismissed for further
state court proceedings, considered any of the other three
prongs of Complete Auto. 156 State cases that probe the three
non-discrimination prongs of Complete Auto remain common,
but since Quill no state case has found that a state tax imposed
an “undue burden” on interstate commerce apart from
consideration of the Complete Auto standards. 157
154. Id. at 178, 183-200.
155. See Fatale, supra note 7, at n.113 and accompanying text.
156. See generally MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. 149 (2008).
Recently, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision affirmed a Maryland opinion
striking down a component of that state’s personal income tax on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds. Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
Although the lower Maryland court decision had been decided on both fair
apportionment and discrimination grounds, see id. at 1793, the Supreme Court
affirmed only on the discrimination basis, see id. at 1795, 1803-1804. The
Maryland decision had considered the Court’s pre-existing doctrine pertaining to
“internal consistency”—which evaluates “double” or “multiple” taxation—to be a
principle that evaluates fair apportionment. Comptroller v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453,
463-470 (Md. 2013). However, the Supreme Court’s majority decision re-posited
that doctrine as one that evaluates discrimination. See 135 S. Ct. at 1803-1804.
The Court’s emphasis on the discrimination principle in the Wynne case is
striking—the notion is specifically referred to in the majority decision 44 times,
whereas fair apportionment is mentioned only 4 times—3 times in the Court’s
summary of the lower Maryland court decision. See generally Wynne, 135 S. Ct.
1787.
The Wynne majority specifically endeavored to defend the dormant Commerce
Clause against critiques leveled by the dissenting Justices Thomas and Scalia
that the doctrine is not rooted in the Constitution. Id. at 1806-07. However, that
defense—even apart from resting on only 5 votes—was narrow. The majority’s
defense specifically referenced—consistent with its analysis in the case more
generally—only the importance of addressing state tax discrimination as
implemented through “tariffs” and as implied by the state-created threat of
double taxation. Id. at 1804, 1807-09.
157. A LEXIS search performed for this period reveals only three cases where
a taxpayer claiming that a tax imposed an “undue burden” prevailed—and in two
of those cases the state charge at issue was arguably not even a tax. See American
Business USA Corp. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 4D13-1472 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 12 2014)
(concluding imposition of a use tax imposed an undue burden because it violated
the Quill substantial nexus test); American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. New
Jersey, 852 A.2d 142, 166 (N.J. 2004) (annual hazardous waste transporter
registration fees assessed against out-of-state transporters are construed to be
“taxes” and struck down under Complete Auto’s fourth prong as imposing an
undue burden because the fees were unrelated to the transponders’ level of
activity in the state; also, the fees are struck down as failing Complete Auto’s
prongs of fair apportionment and discrimination); Radio Common Carriers of
New York v. New York, 601 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct., NY County 1993) (similar
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Outside the state tax area, the “undue burden” standard
is technically still relevant as a matter of Supreme Court
precedent as one of two tests that evaluate whether a state
regulation—as opposed to a state tax—violates the principles
of the Commerce Clause. 158 Even in this context, however, the
Court has been reluctant to apply the undue burden test
because it invites subjective judicial determinations similar to
those that characterized the Court’s Commerce Clause state
tax cases prior to Complete Auto. 159
II.

DUE PROCESS JURISDICTION FOR STATE TAX
PURPOSES POST-J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V.
NICASTRO 160

Recently, the Supreme Court has decided several cases
that apply due process principles to the determination of
adjudicative jurisdiction, including the specific jurisdiction
case, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. 161 These cases
are relevant to the state tax jurisdiction inquiry because the
state tax and adjudicative jurisdiction due process inquiries
are “comparable.” 162 These cases are potentially important to
the state tax analysis because the relevant constitutional
limitations that apply to state tax jurisdiction now derive
primarily from the Due Process Clause. 163
The Due Process Clause is set forth in the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1868, and
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” 164 The Due Process
analysis as in American Trucking with respect to “special fee” imposed on “paging
devices”).
158. See Fatale, supra note 7 at notes 99–100 and accompanying text. The
second of the two tests is whether the state regulation is discriminatory. See id.
159. See Fatale, supra note 7 at notes 97–106 and accompanying text. See also
supra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. In the regulatory context, evaluation
of an “undue burden” requires a balancing of the burdens of the regulation as
measured against the state’s interest in implementing the regulation. See
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)
(quoting Pike v. Bruce, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). That approach is particularly
problematic in the state tax context because it leaves “much room for controversy
and confusion and little in the way of precise guidance to the states in their
exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.” See Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984).
160. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
161. Id. See infra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
162. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
163. See generally supra notes 96–147 and accompanying text.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating, “[N]or shall any state deprive any
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Clause has been applied to corporations in state tax cases
dating back to the late 1800’s. 165 In state tax jurisdiction cases,
the longstanding due process question is whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask a return. 166 More
specifically, “[t]he Due Process Clause demands that there
exist some definite link, some minimum connection, between a
state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” 167
A. International Shoe Co. v. Washington 168 and the Birth
of Modern Due Process Analysis
There are three recent U.S. Supreme Court cases
construing the Due Process Clause that have generated
considerable attention: Daimler AG v. Bauman, 169 J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 170 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, SA v. Brown. 171 These cases pay tribute to the
1945 Supreme Court case, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington. 172
Goodyear called International Shoe
person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law”).
165. See, e.g., Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 226
(1897).
166. See MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (stating the question as “ ‘ whether
the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection,
opportunities and benefits given by the state’ ” —that is, “ ‘ whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask return.’ ” ) (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho
Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982), in turn quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney
Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). MeadWestvaco stated that this same question also
informs Commerce Clause jurisdictional questions. See id. See also supra note
64 and accompanying text (Court statements to the effect that, notwithstanding
the Commerce Clause, interstate commerce can be made to pay its fair share of
state tax).
167. MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (quoting Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306,
in turn quoting Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).
MeadWestvaco noted that this due process limitation “on a State’s power to tax
out-of-state activities” is distinct from that applied under the Commerce Clause
but nonetheless “parallel.” Id.
168. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
169. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
170. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
171. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
172. 326 U. S. 310 (1945). A fourth due process case decided in 2014, Walden
v. Fiore, also repeatedly references International Shoe. See 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121–
23 (2014). But Walden is not generally relevant to this Article because the
defendant in Walden was an individual that was not engaged in business activity.
See id. at 1119. Also, Walden was admitted by the Court to be an easy case that
could be decided applying “[w]ell-established principles of personal jurisdiction.”
Id. at 1126. See John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman
and Fiore, LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCH. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 201422, (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2535367## (noting Walden’s “modest intentions” to “reinforce the minimum
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“pathmarking;” 173 Daimler called the opinion “canonical.” 174
McIntyre resulted in three separate decisions with distinct
reasoning, but “[a]ll nine Justices agreed that . . . the
International Shoe test provided the appropriate analysis.” 175
Even Quill, the most recent Supreme Court case to evaluate
due process jurisdiction for state tax purposes, referred to
International Shoe as the “seminal case” pertaining to such
jurisdiction. 176 International Shoe, which evaluated a state tax
imposed upon an interstate business, 177 first articulated the
jurisdictional “minimum contacts” test that continues to be
applied in adjudicative and state tax jurisdiction cases. 178
International Shoe, therefore, is an appropriate place to begin
an analysis of due process jurisdiction as applied to state
taxation.
International Shoe evaluated adjudicative jurisdiction as
relevant to a multistate corporation that was seeking to avoid
the imposition of a state tax. 179 The tax in question was
imposed upon employers conducting business in the state for
the purpose of providing a fund to be used for financial

contacts test”).
173. 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
174. 134 S. Ct. at 754.
175. Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45
CONN. L. REV. 41, 60 (2012). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in McIntyre argued that
Kennedy’s plurality opinion is inconsistent with the spirit of International Shoe.
131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I take heart that the plurality
opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion would take a giant step
away from the ‘notions of fair play and substantial justice’ underlying
International Shoe.”) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). Some
commentators have agreed. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional
Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561,
581–82 (1995); Eric Schepard, The Battle for the Soul of International Shoe: Why
the Author of International Shoe would Condemn the Nicastro Plurality for
Hijacking his Legacy of Judicial Restraint, 32 QUNNIPIAC L. REV. 352, 383–87
(2014).
176. 504 U.S. at 307.
177. 326 U.S. at 311.
178. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (“Building on the seminal case of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), we have framed the relevant
inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction
“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S.at 316). See
also MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (“The Due Process Clause demands that
there exist some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax”) (quoting Quill Corp., 504 U.S.
at 306).
179. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311.

2015]

DUE PROCESS & TAX JURISDICTION

597

assistance to newly unemployed state workers. 180 The Court’s
pre-existing rules for due process jurisdiction required that a
company maintain an in-state presence to be subject to a
state’s adjudicative jurisdiction. 181 The corporation at issue
had “carefully structured its distribution operations” to avoid
creating this jurisdiction in the state in question and in other
states. 182 In particular, the corporation limited its contacts
with the state to certain specific activities conducted by sales
persons that were, under the law of the day, insufficient to
establish the required presence necessary for adjudicative
jurisdiction. 183
Despite the applicable law, the Court in International
Shoe rejected the corporation’s claim and re-formulated the
Court’s long-standing jurisdictional rules to preclude the
corporation’s argument in future cases. The Court reasoned
that applying an in-state presence standard to a corporation
made no sense because corporations, unlike natural persons,
are not in fact present anywhere. 184 Therefore, the Court
concluded that “[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” 185 The Court
re-cast the appropriate due process jurisdiction standard,
180. Id. at 311–12.
181. See id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)).
182. See Cameron and Johnson, supra note 61, at 803–04. See also Cameron
and Johnson, supra note 61, at 799, 799 n.127 (quoting the company’s general
counsel in 1995: “[International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)] was primarily a tax
case—we did not want to pay unemployment taxes to the state of Washington.”)
183. See Cameron and Johnson, supra note 61 at 803–04.
See also
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313–14.
184. The Court stated:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted
upon as though it were a fact, Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 282 U.S.
24, it is clear that, unlike an individual, its “presence” without, as well as within,
the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf
by those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so far
“present” there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation
or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the
question to be decided. For the terms “present” or “presence” are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those demands
may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require
the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.
326 U.S. at 316–17.
185. Id. at 319.
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holding “that a State may authorize its courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the
defendant has certain minimum contacts with [the State] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 186
International Shoe articulated what would become the
Court’s recognized due process dichotomy between specific and
general jurisdiction. 187 Specific jurisdiction obtains where the
cause of action “arises out of or relates to the” the defendant’s
activity in the state. 188 General jurisdiction obtains where a
defendant’s “continuous corporate operations within a state
[are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.” 189 General jurisdiction cases,
unlike specific jurisdiction cases, allow a plaintiff to sue the
defendant corporation in a forum as to any act of the
defendant, wherever undertaken, on the theory that the
corporation is either incorporated in, domiciled in, or otherwise
“at home” in that forum. 190
B. General Jurisdiction Due Process Cases
General jurisdiction cases are less common than specific
jurisdiction cases. 191 There have been four decisions since
International Shoe where the Court has considered whether an
out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state contacts were
sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to justify the exercise
of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those
186. Id. at 316 (internal quotes omitted). There was no Commerce Clause
issue in International Shoe because Congress had authorized state collection of
the taxes at issue. See id. at 315.
187. The Court later defined the concepts based on logic set forth by Professors
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman. See John N. Drobak, Personal
Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1711–12 (2012).
188. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quotes omitted).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 760–61. See Donald Earl Childress, General Jurisdiction and the
Transnational Law Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 70 (2013) (“The Court has
imposed these heightened requirements for the exercise of general jurisdiction
because a state may legitimately exercise adjudicative power over a defendant’s
worldwide conduct only when the defendant is so closely connected to the forum
state as to be analogous to a citizen or resident.”).
191. See Daimler, 134 U.S. at 755 (“Since International Shoe[, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)] ‘specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction
theory, while general jurisdiction [has played] a reduced role.’ ” ) (quoting
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct., at 2854).
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contacts. 192
In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 193 the Court held
that general jurisdiction was appropriately exercised over a
Philippine corporation sued in Ohio, where the company’s
affairs were overseen during World War II. 194 In contrast, in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 195 the Court
held that general jurisdiction did not apply. 196 In Helicopteros,
a helicopter owned by a Colombian corporation crashed in Peru
and survivors of U.S. citizens who died in the crash were
barred from maintaining wrongful-death actions against the
Colombian corporation in Texas based on the corporation’s
helicopter purchases and purchase-linked activity in Texas. 197
More recently, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA
v. Brown, 198 the Court concluded that there was no general
jurisdiction where North Carolina parents of two boys killed in
a bus accident that occurred outside Paris brought a wrongfuldeath suit in North Carolina state court alleging that the bus’s
tires were defectively manufactured. 199 The complaint named
as defendants not only The Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company (Goodyear), an Ohio corporation, but also Goodyear’s
Turkish, French, and Luxembourgian subsidiaries. 200 The

192. Goodyear states that there were “only two [such] decisions postdating
International Shoe, [326 U. S. 310 (1945)],” 564 U.S. at 2854, but Goodyear itself
and the 2014 case, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), make four.
193. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
194. Id at 447–48. Benguet had ceased its mining operations during the
Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II; its president moved to
Ohio, where he kept an office, maintained the company’s files, and oversaw the
company’s activities. Id. The plaintiff, an Ohio resident, sued Benguet on a claim
that neither arose in Ohio nor related to the corporation’s activities in that State.
Id. at 431. The Court held that the Ohio courts could exercise general jurisdiction
over Benguet without offending due process because, as noted in the Supreme
Court’s later case, Daimler, “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary,
place of business.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 (quotes omitted).
195. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
196. Id. at 408.
197. Id. at 415–16. That company’s contacts with Texas were confined to
“sending its chief executive officer to Houston for contract-negotiation sessions;
accepting into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank;
purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a Texas-based
helicopter company] for substantial sums; and sending personnel to [Texas] for
training.” Id. at 416.
198. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
199. Id. at 2851.
200. Id. at 2850. The Court posed the question as “Are foreign subsidiaries of
a United States parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims
unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?” Id.
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Court noted that the foreign subsidiaries, which manufactured
tires for sale in Europe and Asia, lacked any affiliation with
North Carolina. 201 Therefore, because Goodyear’s three foreign
subsidiaries were “in no sense at home in North Carolina,” the
Court concluded that those subsidiaries could not be required
to submit to the general jurisdiction of that state’s courts. 202
In 2014, in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 203 the Court evaluated
a fourth general jurisdiction claim pertaining to a foreign
corporation. 204 Daimler also represented the third time that
the Court evaluated such a claim pertaining to injuries
sustained as the result of alleged tortuous action. 205 In
Daimler, the respondents were residents of Argentina who
filed suit in California, naming as a defendant a German public
stock company (Daimler) that was the parent corporation of an
Argentinean subsidiary alleged to have collaborated with state
security forces in Argentina to harm certain workers of the
subsidiary. 206 A claim for general personal jurisdiction over
Daimler was predicated on the California contacts of another
subsidiary of the parent, one incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in New Jersey. 207 That second
subsidiary distributed Daimler-manufactured vehicles to
independent dealerships throughout the United States,
including California. 208
201. Id. at 2851.
202. Id. at 2857. A small percentage of tires manufactured by the foreign
subsidiaries were distributed in North Carolina, which prompted the North
Carolina Supreme Court to permit general jurisdiction on the theory that the
subsidiaries had placed these tires into a “stream of commerce.” 131 S. Ct. at
2851. The Court responded that “[a]lthough the placement of a product into the
stream of commerce “may bolster an affiliation germane to specific
jurisdiction, . . .” such contacts “do not warrant a determination that, based on
those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id. at 2855. In
its briefs, the plaintiff made a belated claim that the Court should allow general
jurisdiction on the theory that the subsidiaries were engaged in a unitary
business with the parent, but, given the lateness of this claim, the Court refused
to evaluate it. Id. at 2857. See infra note 408 and accompanying text.
203. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
204. Each of the Court’s three prior general jurisdiction cases pertained to a
foreign corporation. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846 (2011), Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. 42 U.S. 437 (1952).
205. The prior such cases were Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text.
206. 134 S. Ct. at 750–51.
207. Id. at 751.
208. Id.

2015]

DUE PROCESS & TAX JURISDICTION

601

The Court in Daimler concluded that Daimler was not
amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by
conduct of its Argentinean subsidiary that took place entirely
outside the United States. 209 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court questioned whether the activities of Daimler’s Ohio
subsidiary could be imputed to Daimler, but noted that in any
event neither Daimler nor its Ohio subsidiary was
incorporated in California or had its principal place of business
there, as would be required for purposes of establishing
general jurisdiction. 210
The theory that supports general jurisdiction resembles
that which permits a state to tax all of the income of the state’s
residents irrespective of where their income is earned. 211
However, most cases that pertain to a state’s ability to tax a
multistate business do not raise questions of whether the
corporation may be subject to tax on this basis. Rather, most
state tax cases raise questions about whether a state can
impose tax on income or sales that are derived from within the
state.
Consequently, most state tax cases are specific
jurisdiction cases. 212
C. Specific Jurisdiction Due Process Cases
Subsequent to International Shoe, there were several
important specific jurisdiction cases relating to state tax

209. Id.
210. Id. at 760–62. The Court also noted concerns about international comity.
Id. at 762–63.
211. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 463
(1995) (a State “may tax all the income its residents, even income earned outside
the taxing jurisdiction”); McCullough v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316, 428–29 (noting
the States’ “power of taxing [their] people and their property to the utmost extent”
and finding it “almost . . . self-evident” that “[a]ll subjects over which the
sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation.”). See also Lea
Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1277, 1307 (1989)
(“Since non-domiciliaries lack the opportunity to participate in electoral
processes, some sort of purposeful action towards the territory by the individual
is necessary to justify the exertion of state authority. Absent such a volitional
act, there would be no way at all to influence the legal norms that governed one’s
behavior.”). But see Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1798-2000 (2015)
(noting that the application of this tax doctrine is subject to the stricture that a
state may not discriminate against interstate commerce).
212. See Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in State and Local
Taxation, 67 TAX LAWYER 623, 635 (2014); Helen Hecht, Is There a Due Process
Cloud on the Sales and Use Tax Horizon?, 24 J. MULTISTATE TAX 6, 14 (2014). See
also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 237 Cal. App. 4th 193, 217
(2015).
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collection, leading up to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota. 213 In the
1960 case, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 214 the Court extended the
logic in International Shoe to state sales taxes, finding that an
out-of-state corporation was subject to a state’s use tax
collection duty based on in-state sales solicitation activities of
the company’s non-employee representatives. 215 Specifically,
the Court concluded that there was, as required, “some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” 216 The Court
noted that although the sales representatives were
contractually termed as being “independent contractors” 217 and
not “employees,” “such a fine distinction is without
constitutional significance” since “[t]he formal shift in the
contractual tagging of the salesman as “independent” neither
results in changing his local function of solicitation nor bears
upon its effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods
into [the state].” 218 The Court further concluded that “[t]o
permit such formal ‘contractual shifts’ to make a constitutional
difference would open the gates to a stampede of tax
avoidance.” 219
In the 1970 case, National Geographic Society v.
California Bd. of Equalization, 220 the appellant (the “Society”),

213. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
214. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
215. Id. at 210–11 (noting, inter alia, that the ““salesmen” were “not regular
employees of appellant devoting full time to its service” and that these persons
worked for “several principals”).
216. Id. at 211 (internal quotes omitted). The Court stated also, echoing
International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945), that “[t]he test is simply the
nature and extent of the activities of the appellant in [the state].” Id. at 211–12.
217. The contract specifically provided that it is the intention of the parties “to
create the relationship . . . of independent contractor.” Id. at 209.
218. Id. at 211.
219. Id. See Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue,
483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) (agreeing with this logic in Scripto). Similar concerns
about inadvertently fostering tax planning also informed the Court’s decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), see supra notes 179–
86 and accompanying text, and have informed the Court’s decisions with respect
to the “unitary business principle” as applied as an apportionment method in the
context of state corporate income tax cases. See Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1983) (critiquing a different
methodology, “formal geographical or transactional accounting,” as a way of
attributing corporate income to a state because one “problem with this method is
that formal accounting is subject to manipulation.”). See also Complete Auto, 430
U.S. at 281 (expressing disdain for judicial rules evaluating state taxes that posit
form over substance).
220. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
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a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in the District of
Columbia, maintained two offices in California that solicited
advertising for the Society’s magazine. 221 These offices
performed no activities that were directly related to the
Society’s mail-order business through which the Society sold
maps, atlases, globes, and books from its headquarters. 222 The
Society challenged California’s attempt to apply its use tax
collection duty to its in-state mail order sales on due process
grounds. 223 The Court held that California’s imposition of the
use-tax-collection liability on the Society’s mail-order
operation did not violate the Due Process Clause since the
Society’s continuous presence in California in the two offices
provided a sufficient nexus between the Society and the state
to justify imposition of the use tax collection duty. 224 The Court
concluded that it was immaterial that there was no direct
relationship between the Society’s sales activity in California
and the two advertising offices located there because the issue
was “simply whether the facts demonstrate some definite link,
some minimum connection, between [the State and] the
person . . . it seeks to tax.” 225
The 1985 case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 226 is not a
state tax case, but is nonetheless important to the state tax
analysis, in part because the case was later relied upon by
Quill. 227 In Burger King, the Court concluded that a franchisor
headquartered in Florida could maintain a breach-of-contract
action in Florida against Michigan franchisees that had no
physical ties to Florida, since the parties’ agreement
contemplated, and in fact resulted in, on-going mail and
telephone interactions between the franchisees and the
franchisor’s headquarters. 228 The Court noted that its decision
was warranted given, among other things, that the owner of
the franchisees was an “experienced and sophisticated”

221. Id. at 552.
222. Id. Orders for the Society’s sales items were mailed from California
directly to appellant’s headquarters on coupons or forms enclosed with
announcements previously mailed to Society members and magazine subscribers
or on order forms contained in the magazine. Id.
223. Id. at 554.
224. Id. at 560–62.
225. 430 U.S. at 561 (internal quotes omitted).
226. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
227. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307–08.
228. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480–81, 487.
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businessman who did not act under economic duress, 229 and
that the franchise contract reasonably should have suggested
to the franchisee that lawsuits under such contract could be
filed against him in Florida. 230
In 1992, Quill determined that a mail order vendor not
otherwise present in the state was subject to due process
jurisdiction when it mailed a large volume of catalogs into the
state and used common carriers to deliver its considerable
products sold there. 231 International Shoe had previously held
that an in-state corporate presence is not required for
adjudicative jurisdiction and Quill relied upon International
Shoe and Burger King to conclude that physical presence is
also not required as a matter of due process for state tax
jurisdiction. 232 In so holding, Quill formally overruled the
Court’s prior contrary holding in National Bellas Hess. 233 The
Court noted that under its current jurisprudence “notice” or
“fair warning” is the analytic “touchstone of due process nexus
analysis.” 234 It concluded that “[s]o long as a commercial
actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of
another State”—for example, through “continuous and
widespreadsolicitation of business within a State”-–such actor
“clearly has fair warning that its activity may subject it to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” 235
D. Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of
Calif. 236
For the past several decades the Court’s application of the
minimum contacts analysis set forth in International Shoe has
relied significantly on Asahi Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior

229. Id. at 484–85.
230. Id. at 481–82.
231. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306–08.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 308 (“Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the
Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of
duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by
developments in the law of due process.”). In contrast, the case retained the
physical presence standard for Commerce Clause purposes so the company in
question was not required to pay retroactive use taxes. See supra notes 88–98
and accompanying text.
234. Id. at 312.
235. Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985) and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
236. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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Court of Calif. 237 Asahi was a plurality decision that splintered
4-4 as to the practical application of this test. 238
In Asahi, a Taiwanese motorcycle manufacturer sought
jurisdiction in California over a Japanese company that
manufactured motorcycle parts in Japan that were alleged to
be the proximate cause of a motorcycle accident that took place
in California. 239 The Japanese company sold its parts into the
stream of commerce and was aware that tires incorporating its
parts would be sold in California. 240 However, the company did
not: (1) do business in California; (2) have an office, agents,
employees, or property in California; or (3) advertise or solicit
business in California. 241 The company also did not create,
control, or employ the distribution system that brought its
assemblies to, or design these assemblies in anticipation of
sales in, California. 242
Justice Brennan, writing for four Justices, concluded that
as long as a party is aware that its product is being marketed
in the forum state, jurisdiction premised on the placement of
the product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the
Due Process Clause, and no showing of additional conduct is
required. 243 He further concluded that even though the
petitioner did not design or control the distribution system that
carried its assemblies into California, the fact that it made
regular and extensive sales to a manufacturer that it knew was
making regular sales of the final product in California was
sufficient to establish minimum contacts jurisdiction. 244
Applying this standard, Justice Brennan would have found the
existence of jurisdiction if not for the existence of special
factual circumstances. 245
Justice O’Connor, also writing for four Justices, differed
with Justice Brennan. She concluded that the “substantial
connection” between a defendant and the forum state
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must derive from

237. Id.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 105–06.
240. Id. at 106–07.
241. Id. at 112–13
242. 480 U.S. at 112–13.
243. Id. at 116–17, 121 (Brennan, J.).
244. Id. at 121
245. Id. at 116–17, 121. The special factual circumstances are discussed infra
notes 249–254 and accompanying text.
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an action purposely directed toward the forum state. 246 Also,
she concluded that the mere placement of a product into the
stream of commerce is not such an act, even if done with
awareness that the stream will sweep the product into the
forum state—absent additional conduct indicating an intent to
serve the forum state market. 247 Those additional acts could
include, for example, designing the product for the market in
the forum state, advertising in the forum state, establishing
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the
forum state, or marketing the product through a distributor
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum state. 248
Despite the disagreement on the minimum contacts
analysis, all nine Justices that took part in Asahi agreed that
jurisdiction was not appropriate on the facts. 249 The holding
was based on the Justices’ conclusion that, given the unusual
facts, it would not have been fair and reasonable for
jurisdiction to apply. 250 In making this determination the
Court considered the burden on the defendant, the interests of
the forum State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
relief. 251 It also weighed in its determination “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.” 252 In general, the outcome of the reasonableness
analysis turned on the facts that: (1) the action was one for
indemnification, not a case with respect to the underlying
California accident; (2) the transaction on which the claim was
based took place in Taiwan; and (3) both parties were foreign
246. Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J.).
247. Id. at 112–13 (O’Connor, J.). See id. at 108 (noting the fact that “Asahi
did not design or control the system of distribution that carried its valve
assemblies into California”).
248. 480 U.S. at 112. See also id. (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert
the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully
directed toward the forum State.”).
249. See generally 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Justice Stevens did not join the
minimum contacts analysis of either Justice Brennan or Justice O’Connor
because he did not think it was necessary for the disposition of the case. Id. at
121–22 (Stevens, J.).
250. Id. at 113–16, 121–22 (eight of the nine Justices—all but Justice Scalia—
agreed with this analysis). Compare International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (stating that jurisdiction must not offend “traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice”).
251. 480 U.S. at 113.
252. Id.
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nationals. 253 Consequently, the interest of California in
hearing the case was slight, and there was a need to consider
the procedural and substantive policies of other nations. 254
E. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro 255
After Asahi, the courts split on the appropriate minimum
contacts theory to apply, with some courts applying Justice
Brennan’s stream of commerce theory and other courts
applying Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce-plus
theory. 256 Almost thirty-five years later the Supreme Court
revisited Asahi in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. 257
The Court’s decision in McIntyre was intended, in part, to
resolve the confusion created by Asahi. 258 However, McIntyre
only increased the confusion—and created considerable
controversy. 259 Whereas Asahi resulted in a 4-4 stalemate on
the minimum contacts question, 260 McIntyre broke 4-2-3. 261
1. The Decision
In McIntyre, the cause of action was—as in Asahi—
predicated on an accident allegedly caused by a foreign
manufacturer’s defective product. 262 Jurisdiction was sought

253. Id. at 114–16.
254. Id. The Court stated that “Great care and reserve should be exercised
when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.”
Id. at 115 (quotes omitted).
255. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
256. Id. at 2789 (“Since Asahi was decided, the courts have sought to reconcile
the competing opinions”). See also Adam N. Steinman, The Meaning of McIntyre,
18 Sw. J. Int’l 417, 418 (noting the “post-Asahi uncertainty”); Robin J. Effron,
Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in
Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 867, 879–80 (2012)
(discussing the post-Asahi disagreements in the lower federal courts).
257. See generally 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
258. Id. at 2785 (stating an intent to address the “decades-old questions left
open by Asahi” in jurisdictional cases pertaining to an “absent party”) (Kennedy,
J.).
259. McIntyre has been heavily criticized by commentators both for its holding
and the fact that it produced no clear single opinion. See e.g., Effron, supra note
256, at 868, 868 n.3 (citing articles); Drobak, supra note 187, at 1729; Steinman,
supra note 256, at 425–26; John T. Parry, Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities
of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 827, 851–52 (2012).
260. See supra notes 243–48 and accompanying text.
261. See generally McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
262. Compare McIntyre, 31 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) with Asahi, 480 U.S. 102,
105–06 (1987). The recent 2011 case, Goodyear, involved a similar allegation.
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850. See also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014) (pertaining
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in a court in New Jersey—the site of the accident—based on
three primary facts. 263 First, a U.S. distributor agreed to sell
the defendant’s machines in the United States. 264 Second,
officials of the defendant attended trade shows in several
states, though not in New Jersey. 265 Third, no more than four
of the defendant’s machines, including the one at issue, ended
up in New Jersey. 266 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that
New Jersey’s courts could exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer without contravening the Due Process Clause so
long as the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have
known that its products were distributed through a nationwide
distribution system that might lead to sales in any of the
states. 267 The New Jersey court invoked Justice Brennan’s
“stream-of-commerce” test from Asahi to find such jurisdiction,
even though at no time had the manufacturer advertised in,
sent goods to, or in any relevant sense targeted the state. 268
a. Justice Kennedy’s opinion
The Supreme Court reversed, in a splintered decision that
produced minimal analytic consensus. Justice Kennedy,
writing for four Justices, agreed with the Court’s prior
precedent that the appropriate standard was whether the
defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
to a jurisdiction claim based on a foreign corporation’s allegedly tortuous
conduct).
263. 31 S. Ct. at 2786, 2790–91.
264. Id. The distributor had a similar name as the manufacturer but “the two
companies were separate and independent entities with no commonality of
ownership or management.” Id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quotations
omitted). There was “no allegation that the distributor was under [the
manufacturer’s] control.” Id. at 2786. The distributor “structured [its]
advertising and sales efforts in accordance with”the manufacturer’s” direction
and guidance whenever possible” and “at least some of the machines were sold on
consignment to” the distributor. Id. (square brackets in original).
265. Id. at 2786, 2790–91. See also id. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 2786, 2790. The machine that injured the plaintiff was purchased
as a result of a demonstration made to the plaintiff’s employer at a Nevada trade
show. See 31 S. Ct. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The employer later
purchased the machine from McIntyre’s American distributor, based in Ohio,
with a check payable to that distributor. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery
America, 987 A.2d 575, 578 (N.J. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct 2780 (2011). There were
no conclusive facts as to any other sales made to New Jersey customers. J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
267. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
268. Id. (At “no time [had the manufacturer] either marketed goods in the
State or shipped them there.”).
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conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.” 269 He concluded, however,
that this standard was not met because the defendant never
engaged in any activities in New Jersey that revealed an
intention to invoke or benefit from the protection of the state’s
laws. 270 He noted the fact that the company had no office in
New Jersey; neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and
neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State. 271
Indeed, he pointed out, the trial court found that the petitioner
did not have a single contact with New Jersey apart from the
fact that the machine in question ended up there. 272 He
concluded that the facts of the case “may reveal an intent to
serve the U.S. market, but they do not show that [the
defendant] purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey
market.” 273
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the confusion caused by
the competing plurality opinions in Asahi. 274 He rejected
Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce” test because in his
view it is “the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that
empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.” 275 He
stated that a defendant’s placement of goods into commerce
“with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers within the forum State” might indicate purposeful
availment, 276 but that more was required – “the principal
inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s
activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a
sovereign.” 277
Justice Kennedy’s injection of the sovereignty analysis
into the purposeful availment test was novel. 278 He stated two

269. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J.) (quotes omitted).
270. Id. at 2791.
271. Id. at 2790.
272. Id.
273. 131 S. Ct. at 2790.
274. Id. at 2789 (“Since Asahi was decided, the courts have sought to reconcile
the competing opinions.”).
275. Id. at 2788.
276. Id. (stating also that “a defendant may in an appropriate case be subject
to jurisdiction without entering the forum . . . as where manufacturers or
distributors seek to serve a given State’s market.”).
277. Id. (“In other words, the defendant must “purposefully avai[l] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.”)
278. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“the constitutional limits on a
state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not
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principles that were implicit in his reasoning. First, personal
jurisdiction “requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-bysovereign, analysis.” 279 He stated that “[t]he question is
whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed
at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a
given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject
the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.” 280 Justice
Kennedy’s second principle was a corollary of the first:
“[b]ecause the United States is a distinct sovereign, a
defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States but not of any particular State.” 281
However, he noted that the latter possibility “would be an
exceptional case”—in part because “foreign corporations will
often target or concentrate on particular States, subjecting
them to specific jurisdiction in those forums.” 282
Justice Kennedy suggested that his jurisdictional concerns
were primarily with respect to foreign defendants—a fact also
at issue in Asahi, 283 and in the more recent general jurisdiction
cases, Goodyear 284 and Daimler. 285 In McIntyre, the foreign
corporation was one that had not targeted the markets of any
particular state or states, but rather the United States in
Also, Justice Kennedy’s second sovereignty
general. 286
principle—pertaining to whether federal due process
jurisdiction might apply where no state court jurisdiction
would—presumably would arise primarily with respect to
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
foreign defendants. 287
state sovereignty”); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 204 n.20 (1977)
(recognizing that “the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States [is not] the
central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction”).
279. 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J).
280. Id. (stating also that “Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts ‘judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,’ for
due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power. But
whether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has
authority to render it.”) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2789–90.
283. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
284. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
285. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
286. 131 S. Ct. at 2790.
287. Id. (Kennedy, J.) (“For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite
relationship with the United States Government but not with the government of
any individual State. That would be an exceptional case, however. If the
defendant is a domestic domiciliary, the courts of its home State are available
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repeatedly referenced Justice Kennedy’s analysis as being with
respect to foreign defendants. 288
However, Justice Kennedy also made clear that his
general analysis potentially applied in situations where the
defendant was a U.S. producer. He stated that:
It must be remembered, however, that although this case
and Asahi both involve foreign manufacturers, the
undesirable consequences of Justice Brennan’s approach
are no less significant for domestic producers. The owner of
a small Florida farm might sell crops to a large nearby
distributor, for example, who might then distribute them to
grocers across the country. If foreseeability were the
controlling criterion, the farmer could be sued in Alaska or
any number of other States’ courts without ever leaving
town. 289

Justice Kennedy conceded that sometimes a defendant
might meet his construction of the purposeful availment test
“by sending [into the state] its goods rather than its agents.” 290
But in those cases, “the defendant’s transmission of goods
permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant
can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is
not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its
goods will reach the forum State.” 291 Consequently, Justice
Kennedy aligned himself with Justice O’Connor’s “stream-ofcommerce-plus” theory—a point that he admitted. 292 But he
also stated that this theory would not by itself resolve many
difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular
cases. 293
and can exercise general jurisdiction”).
288. See, e.g., id. at 2799 (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (“This case is illustrative of
marketing arrangements for sales in the United States common in today’s
commercial world. A foreign-country manufacturer engages a U. S. company to
promote and distribute the manufacturer’s products, not in any particular State,
but anywhere and everywhere in the United States the distributor can attract
purchasers.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2802 (stating that “this Court has not
considered in any prior case the now-prevalent pattern presented here—a
foreign-country manufacturer enlisting a U.S. distributor to develop a market in
the United States for the manufacturer’s products.”) (emphasis added). Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent is discussed in more detail infra notes 308–13 and
accompanying text.
289. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.).
290. Id. at 2788.
291. 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
292. Id. at 2790 (“the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on
purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi.”).
293. Id. (stating also that “[t]he defendant’s conduct and the economic realities
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Justice Kennedy did not apply the separate fairness test
that resolved the question of jurisdiction with respect to the
foreign defendant in Asahi—perhaps because he considered
this test to be subsumed within his more general sovereignty
Alternatively, the omission may have been
analysis. 294
because the fairness test was not necessary on the facts, given
that the minimum contacts test was not satisfied. 295
b. Justice Breyer’s opinion
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Alito,
agreed with Justice Kennedy as to the disposition of the case,
but did not agree with the analysis. 296 Further, he was not
willing “to announce a rule of broad applicability without fully
considering modern-day consequences.” 297 Justice Breyer
concluded that the disposition of the case was dictated by the
Court’s prior “precedents,” 298 and noted that the facts did not
meet either Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce test or
Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce-plus theory. 299 In

of the market the defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and judicial
exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of that principle.”)
294. See id. at 2787 (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from
traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of
authority into law.”). See Parry, supra note 259, at 844 (arguing that Justice
Kennedy’s statement that a small domestic farmer would be protected from
burdensome litigation in another state by reason of his analysis “suggests that
[for him] there is no fairness inquiry at all.”); Noyes, supra note 175, at 44 (stating
that Justice Kennedy “would eliminate the fairness requirement as redundant”).
295. See Steinman, supra note 256, at 430 (“[I]t would be wrong to read
McIntyre as inferring that second step in the jurisdictional framework. As a
logical matter, there was no need for either Justice Kennedy or Breyer to confront
the reasonableness or fairness factors. They have each concluded that McIntyre
had not purposefully established minimum contacts with New Jersey, which is
the first requirement of the traditional test.”).
296. 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]hough I agree with the
plurality as to the outcome of this case, I concur only in the judgment of that
opinion and not its reasoning.”).
297. Id. at 2791. His rationale was based on the fact that “the case did not
present issues arising from recent changes in commerce and communication.” Id.
298. Id. But see Drobak, supra note 187, at 1735–36 (“Perhaps the most
unusual aspect of the opinions in Nicastro is the claim by the concurrence that
they are doing no more than adhering to . . . precedents.”).
299. 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). Although Justice Breyer
disagreed with the “stream of commerce” approach applied by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, he suggested that his difficulty was not with the test but the way
the court applied the test. See id. (stating that under the New Jersey court’s view,
“a producer is subject to jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it
knows or reasonably should know ‘that its products are distributed through a
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold in
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particular, he stated that “the relevant facts show no
‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey, and
there is no ‘something more,’ such as special state-related
design, advertising, advice, or marketing, that would warrant
the assertion of jurisdiction.” 300
Justice Breyer also noted that the plaintiff “has shown no
specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New
Jersey” and “has not otherwise shown that the British
Manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within New Jersey, or that it delivered its
goods in the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by New Jersey users.” 301 Among other
things, “[h]e has introduced no list of potential New Jersey
customers who might, for example, have regularly attended
trade shows.” 302
Justice Breyer emphasized that what was key to his
determination was that “none of the Court’s precedents finds
that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of
sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.” 303 Unlike Justice
Kennedy, Justice Breyer also applied a fairness inquiry similar
to that applied in Asahi. 304 He concluded that a finding of
jurisdiction would not be fair given the manufacturer’s limited
contacts. 305 Justice Breyer suggested that fairness might
any of the fifty states.’ ” ) (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America, 987
A.2d 575, 592 (N.J. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct 2780 (2011)) (emphasis in original).
300. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (generally quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. 102
(1997)).
301. Id. (quotations omitted).
302. Id. Justice Breyer made reference to the more extensive analysis of the
facts set forth in the dissent. Id. He stated that “[t]here may well have been
other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction.
And the dissent considers some of those facts . . . But the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing jurisdiction, and here I would take the facts precisely as
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated them.” Id. Compare id. at 2801 (Ginsburg,
J. dissenting) (“How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its actions
targeting a national market, to sell products in the fourth largest destination for
imports among all States of the United States and the largest scrap metal
market?”).
303. Id. at 2792. But see Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum
Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 G. WASH. L. REV. 204, 227–28 (arguing
that Justice Breyer’s one-sale conclusion with respect to prior Supreme Court
cases is incorrect); Drobak, supra note 187, at 1734–36 (similar). See infra note
336 and accompanying text (discussing commentary and cases that suggest that
one in-state sale might be sufficient to establish due process jurisdiction in some
instances).
304. 131 S. Ct at 2793. Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–16.
305. 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that he could not
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dictate that a large domestic manufacturer using a large
distributor should be subject to a state’s jurisdiction given its
in-state sales, whereas similar facts would not be sufficient
with respect to a small-sized manufacturer. 306 He also stated—
consistent with the holding in Asahi—that the requisite
fairness necessary for due process jurisdiction is less likely to
exist where the defendant corporation is foreign. 307
c. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent on behalf of three justices
concluded that there was due process jurisdiction. 308 She
reasoned that the defendant had utilized its independent but
exclusive distributor to target the national U.S. market,
including New Jersey. 309 By using the distributor to promote
and sell its machines in the United States, she concluded that
the defendant had “purposefully availed itself” of the United
States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a
discrete collection of States. 310 Therefore, the defendant had
availed itself of the market of all States in which its products
were sold by its exclusive distributor and could be subject to
adjudicative jurisdiction on that basis. 311 She concluded that
it would undermine principles of fundamental fairness to
insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court
at the place within the United States where its products caused
injury. 312
Justice Ginsburg also disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s
“reconcile” the New Jersey court’s approach with “defendant-focused fairness.”)
306. Id. He stated that “a rule like the New Jersey Supreme Court’s would
permit every State to assert jurisdiction in a products-liability suit against any
domestic manufacturer who sells its products (made anywhere in the United
States) to a national distributor, no matter how large or small the manufacturer,
no matter how distant the forum, and no matter how few the number of items
that end up in the particular forum at issue.” Id.
307. Id. at 2793–94 (“[T]he fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a
domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more
uncertain.”). He stated also that “[i]t may be fundamentally unfair to require a
small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan
coffee farmer, selling its products through international distributors, to respond
to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States, even
those in respect to which the foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of
a single (allegedly defective) good.” Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987).
308. 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 2801.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2800–01.

2015]

DUE PROCESS & TAX JURISDICTION

615

emphasis on sovereignty. She concluded, “the constitutional
limits on a state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from
considerations of due process, not state sovereignty. 313
2. Analysis
Commentators have criticized McIntyre for seeking to
resolve the confusion created by Asahi in the adjudicative
jurisdiction context and instead creating more confusion. 314
However, it is clear that McIntyre should not impact the due
process jurisdiction analysis applied in state tax cases.
No one opinion in McIntyre was supported by a majority of
the Justices. 315 Under the rule in U.S. v. Marks, 316 if the
Justices are split as to the rationale for a judgment, with less
than five joining in any one opinion, the rule of the case is
limited to the rationale in which at least five Justices who
supported the judgment may be said to concur. 317 Subsequent
cases and scholars generally agree that McIntyre’s
precedential analysis is that stated in the concurring opinion
of Justice Breyer. 318 Justice Breyer expressed allegiance to the

313. Id. at 2798.
314. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 303, at 228 (“not only does McIntyre not
resolve any of the ambiguities left by Asahi, it adds a host of new problems for
lower courts and jurisdiction scholars trying to understand the proper scope of
specific jurisdiction”); Parry, supra note 259, at 841 (“The most straightforward
observation one can make about Nicastro is that it compounds the [previous]
uncertainty.”).
315. See supra notes 269–318 and accompanying text.
316. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
317. Id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted)).
318. See, e.g., Kaitlyn Findley, Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream of
Commerce Doctrine: Interpreting Justice Breyer’s Concurrence as Implicitly
Inviting Lower Courts to Develop Alternative Jurisdictional Standards, 63 EMORY
L.J. 695, 723 (2014) (“Justice Breyer’s narrow concurrence in the judgment based
on existing precedent is the holding of Nicastro and is binding on all lower
courts.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions
in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 514 and n.220
(2012) (“Marks certainly means that Justice Kennedy’s four-Justice plurality
would not constitute the Supreme Court’s holding in McIntyre. If any opinion
qualified under Marks as the one ‘concurring . . . on the narrowest grounds’ it
would seem to be Justice Breyer’s concurrence”) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193);
Robert M. Pollack, “Not of Any Particular State”: J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v.
Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088, 1105
(2014) (noting that since McIntyre “lower courts have looked to Justice Breyer’s
concurrence for guidance”).
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Court’s prior precedents, 319 rejected Justice Kennedy’s novel
focus on sovereignty concerns, 320 relied heavily on his
understanding that only one of the defendant’s products was
sold in the forum state, 321 and suggested that the plaintiff may
simply have failed to prove the facts necessary for
jurisdiction. 322 Therefore, in general, it may be that McIntyre
affected very little change to Supreme Court doctrine. 323
a. Practical Limitations of McIntyre for State Tax
Purposes
For state tax purposes it is important that McIntyre
suggested practical limits to its holding, both with respect to
the type of company and the nature of the activity to which the
holding could apply. The facts of McIntyre pertained to a
foreign manufacturer – a focus that tends to characterize the
Court’s due process jurisdiction cases 324—and each of the
Justices seemed to conclude that it was with respect to such
facts that the case reasoning would most likely apply. 325 A
significant assumed fact in McIntyre was that the defendant
319. 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my view, the outcome of
this case is determined by our precedents.”)
320. See id. at 2792–93 (stating that the facts of the case are “an unsuitable
vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional
rules.”)
321. Id. at 2792 (“none of the Court’s precedents finds that a single isolated
sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”)
322. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
323. See Noyes, supra note 175, at 60 (concluding that “The Supreme Court’s
decision in Nicastro does not break much, if any, new ground.”); Findley, supra
note 318, at 733–34 (quoting one federal district court, similar to other courts, as
concluding “that Nicastro’s precedential value is limited to cases involving an
identical fact pattern, ‘otherwise leaving the legal landscape untouched.’ ” )
(quoting Windsor v. Spinner Industry, 825 F. Supp. 2d. 632, 638 (D. Md. 2011));
Steinman, supra note 256, at 426–27 (noting the propensity of lower courts to
distinguish McIntyre on the facts and quoting one federal district court as stating
“At best McIntyre is applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario that
it does.”); Pollack, supra note 318, at 1105 (quoting the Federal Circuit Court as
concluding “that the law remains the same after [Nicastro]”) (quoting AFTG-TG,
LLC v. Nuvoton Tech Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
324. See supra notes 204-205, 239 and 262 and accompanying text. See also
Katherine J. Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimaging Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1511 (2013) (“Although the basic personal jurisdiction
framework applied to U.S. and foreign defendants is the same, U.S. courts have
often shown particular solicitude for foreigners. . . Asahi Metal’s reasonableness
test . . . is predominantly used in the international context [and the Court’s] . . .
most recent personal jurisdiction cases, particularly J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd.
v. Nicastro, reaffirm the Court’s special concern for the rights of foreign actors.”).
325. See supra notes 283–88 and accompanying text.
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targeted the market of the United States in sum and not the
market of any individual state. 326 Justice Breyer noted that
the foreign manufacturer did not even possess a list of
potential customers in New Jersey—a fact that he considered
noteworthy. 327 In contrast, most manufacturers that do
business in the United States—certainly businesses of any size
or ambition—engage in substantial, sophisticated in-state
marketing activity. 328
The Justices in McIntyre seemed to struggle to identify a
situation where the reasoning that justified the case holding
could apply to a domestic manufacturer. 329 The plurality and
the concurring opinions both suggested that the only logical
analogy is one where the domestic manufacturer is a very
small, localized business. 330 Justice Kennedy gave as an
example that of “[t]he owner of a small Florida farm [that]
might sell crops to a large nearby distributor . . . who might
then distribute them to grocers across the country.” 331 Justice
Breyer gave as his example that of “a small manufacturer (say,
an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and
saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a single
item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).” 332
Fact patterns such as these pertaining to small, localized
businesses are not generally of concern to state tax
administrators given that very little tax revenue will be at
stake.
More particularly, the holding in McIntyre was premised
on the fact that the defendant had made only a single sale with
respect to the forum state. 333 Justice Breyer’s opinion, which
326. See supra notes 263–66 and accompanying text. But see supra note 302
and accompanying text.
327. See 131 S. Ct at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the plaintiff has
“introduced no list of potential New Jersey customers who might, for example,
have regularly attended trade shows” and referencing this point when saying
“[t]here may well have been other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have
demonstrated in support of jurisdiction”).
328. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy By Default?, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 61, 64 (2013) (noting that modern businesses “collect reams of data
about us for marketing, pricing, product development and other uses”).
329. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J), 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
330. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J). 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
331. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.).
332. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
333. See Pollack, supra note 318, at 1106 (“The decisional linchpin of the
Breyer opinion lies in his finding that ‘[n]one of our precedents finds that a single
isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is
sufficient’ contact to justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction.”) (quoting
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is likely the precedential opinion resulting from McIntyre, 334
emphasized this point. 335 Therefore the holding in McIntyre
likely only applies—either with respect to a foreign or domestic
entity—in such instances. 336 Perhaps this point more than any
other reveals the limitations of McIntyre as applied to state
taxation. It only takes a single product to bring about a serious
injury and so a single sale can be the basis for the claim of
adjudicative jurisdiction, as it was in McIntyre. 337 But for
purposes of corporate income tax or sales tax, state taxation is
almost always applied to an out-of-state company in instances
in which the company is either engaged in making significant
in-state sales or otherwise engaged in significant in-state
market exploitation. 338
All nine Justices in McIntyre agreed that when a state’s
market is targeted in the manner suggested by Justice
O’Connor’s Asahi opinion there would be due process
jurisdiction. 339 This targeting included, by way of example,
McIntyre 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
334. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
335. 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
336. See supra note 323, citing articles and cases suggesting the case should
be limited to its facts. But the case does not necessarily mean that when a
company makes a single sale into a state there is no potential finding of
adjudicative jurisdiction. Justice Breyer specifically stated that he would respect
the Court’s prior “precedents,” 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring), and in
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., the Court upheld adjudicative jurisdiction in
California even though the defendant had “never solicited or done any insurance
business in California apart from the policy involved here.” 335 U.S. 220, 222
(1957). See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) (“Since International Shoe
[326 U. S. 310 (1945)], this Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on
circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in
cases involving ‘single or occasional acts’ occurring or having their impact within
the forum State) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). For an analysis
of how Justice Breyer’s opinion can be reconciled with McGee, see Steinman,
supra note 256, at 442–43 and n.144. See also infra notes 421–36 (discussing the
recent cases decided under The Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (“PACT”) Act
where, Justice Breyer’s statement in McIntyre notwithstanding, two courts were
not willing to assume that the Supreme Court’s precedent stands for the
proposition that there can never be adjudicative jurisdiction when only a single
sale is made into a state).
337. See 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the accident at
issue was caused by a “single, isolated sale”).
338. See, for example, the cases cited at supra notes 106–47. See also supra
note 336 (noting that a single sale into a state might be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction in some cases).
339. 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.) (noting the “conclusion that the authority
to subject a defendant to judgment depends on purposeful availment, consistent
with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi”); 131 S. Ct at 2792 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s Asahi decision favorably”); 2802
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“designing the product for the market in the forum State,
advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for
providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed
to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.” 340 Some state
tax practitioners have suggested that these standards can be
potentially sidestepped by a manufacturer who chooses to sell
However, Justice
goods through an intermediary. 341
O’Connor’s standards literally apply whether a company’s instate targeting is direct or indirect – and McIntyre provides no
fodder for this argument, as the key relevant point in the case
was that there was no such proven customer-specific direct or
indirect in-state targeting. 342 Also, in any event, once a
company that is engaged in selling products into a state makes
significant sales in that state—irrespective as to the nature of
the targeting—the logic in McIntyre no longer applies. 343
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same). See also Noyes, supra note 175, at 45.
340. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J.). Justice Breyer specifically
referenced these standards. 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J. concurring). Justice
Kennedy embraced Justice O’Connor’s general approach, though he said it might
not work well in difficult cases. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.). Justice Breyer and
Justice Kennedy both suggested that in-state advertising would be a sufficient
contact. See id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.), 2792 (Breyer, J. concurring).
341. See, e.g., Benton, et al., supra note 11 (stating that, given the analysis in
McIntyre, “the interposition of an affiliated or independent “middleman” may
further bolster an argument that an entity is not subject to tax under the due
process clause, so long as the interposed party is truly responsible for directing
the business”); Brian J. Kirkell, et al., supra note 11 (“J. McIntyre Machinery has
infused life into the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution as an effective bar
to state taxation”); Charloette Noel and Karen H. Currie, One-Step-Removed, or
‘Economic,’ Nexus: Not All Contacts With States Are Constitutionally Equal, BNA
WEEKLY STATE TAX REPORT, Sept. 16, 2011 (concluding that McIntyre supports
the claim that indirect or “one-step-removed” state tax nexus assertions are
unconstitutional). Compare McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J.) (asking but
not answering the question: “does it matter if, instead of shipping the products
directly, a company consigns the products through an intermediary (say,
Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders?”).
342. The foreign defendant in McIntyre made sales through an unrelated
intermediary, but Justice Breyer suggested that, despite this fact, the plaintiff
would have prevailed had he shown that the defendant maintained a “list of
potential New Jersey customers who might . . . have regularly attended [U.S.]
trade shows.” Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). In the particular case where a
state seeks to assert a use tax collection duty, the use of an intermediary by a
manufacturer likely would not defeat this collection requirement—irrespective as
to the due process analysis—since, among other things, the obligation to collect
use tax could merely be transferred to the intermediary. See Hecht, supra note
212, at 9.
343. See Noyes, supra note 175, at 45, 60–62 (stating that McIntyre does not
apply where the company’s contacts with the state amount to a “regular course of
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Justice O’Connor’s “stream of commerce plus” standard as
stated in Asahi requires that the defendant place its products
into the stream of commerce and also engage in some
additional state-directed activity, as referenced in the previous
paragraph. 344 McIntyre did not resolve whether Justice
Brennan’s mere stream of commerce test survives when the
defendant has not targeted a state directly but nonetheless
makes more than de miminis in-state sales. Justice Breyer
suggested that it did when he expressed general commitment
to the Court’s precedents and even cited Justice Brennan’s
Asahi decision favorably, 345 and some subsequent lower court
decisions have concluded as much. 346 But this issue is largely
academic when evaluating a state tax. When a state seeks to
apply a sales tax, there is currently a physical presence
jurisdiction requirement that dictates that a vendor do more
than merely place its goods into the stream of commerce to
dealing” rather than the consummation of “a single sale.”) One of the Court’s
precedents retained by McIntyre, see supra notes 318–19 and 323 and
accompanying text, was Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, which stated that where a
commercial actor is engaged in “continuous and widespread solicitation of
business within a state” it is subject to jurisdiction there. 504 U.S. 298, 308
(1992). See supra notes 231–35 (discussing the due process analysis in Quill). In
her dissent in McIntyre, Justice Ginsburg commented on the distinct character of
the product at issue—a $24,000 shearing machine used to process recyclable
materials. She stated: “[McIntyre’s] machine . . . is unlikely to sell in bulk
worldwide, much less in any given State. By dollar value, the price of a single
machine represents a significant sale. Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey
$24,000 worth of flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court
would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit in that State.” 131 S. Ct.
at 2803 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
344. See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text. See also Pollack, supra
note 318, at 1098 (noting that Justice O’Connor’s standard has been referred to
in shorthand as a “stream of commerce plus” or “foreseeability plus” standard).
345. 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. 102,
117 (Brennan, J.)). See also supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 318, 323 and accompanying text. Pollack, supra note 318,
at 1105 (“Most courts have declined to view the rejection of jurisdiction in
Nicastro as an endorsement of Justice O’Connor’s narrower ‘stream of commerce
plus’ minimum contacts test, since in a splintered decision the holding is
represented only by the narrowest agreement among opinions supporting the
outcome, and Justice Breyer’s concurrence did not favor any particular test for
determining minimum contacts”); Oscar G. Chase & Lori Brooke Day, Reexamining New York’s Law of Personal Jurisdiction after Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 76
ALBANY L. REV. 1009, 1050–51 (2012) (“Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion
leaves open the possibility of exercising jurisdiction if a large and consistent
enough flow of a defendant’s product enters [the state] through the stream of
commerce [even if] the defendant has targeted [only] the United States market”)
(square brackets added).
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create jurisdiction. 347 Also, the states’ corporate income taxes
usually require that a taxpayer must have significant in-state
sales or other activity to be subject to tax, and when this
standard is met it is fair to presume that a company has
sufficiently targeted the state. 348
b. Conceptual Problems with Applying McIntyre to
State Taxation
More fundamentally, subsequent to McIntyre, it remains
the case that considerations of fairness are an essential part of
the due process jurisdiction test.
Both the McIntyre
concurrence and the dissent—five of the nine Justices –
specifically concluded as much, and Justice Kennedy’s
plurality decision is not inconsistent with this point. 349
Fairness considerations apply differently in the context of state
taxation than they do for purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction.
The Court’s recent adjudicative jurisdiction cases,
including McIntyre, have paid homage to the Court’s 1945
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 350 and each
of the opinions in McIntyre embraced International Shoe as the
controlling precedent. 351 International Shoe reevaluated the
Court’s prior adjudicative jurisdiction rules to permit a state to
collect tax from a multistate business seemingly because the
Court was concerned with a tax avoidance strategy that was
apparent on the facts. 352 The Court has decided subsequent
due process cases where it has similarly expressed concern
with taxpayer attempts to rely upon the Court’s constitutional
precedent for tax planning purposes, 353 and those cases—as
well as all of the Court’s prior due process precedents—were
specifically retained by McIntyre. 354 Justice Breyer’s opinion is
understood to be the precedential opinion that resulted from

347. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18.
348. See Hecht, supra note 212, at 14 (noting the tendency on the part of courts
to use the amount of sales in a state “as a proxy for evidence of purposefulness of
a seller’s activities with respect to that market.”). See supra notes 109–10 and
accompanying text.
349. See Chase and Day, supra note 346, at n.183. See supra notes 294–95 and
accompanying text (evaluating Justice Kennedy’s view of the due process fairness
inquiry).
350. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
351. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 179–86 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
354. See Noyes, supra note 175, at 60.
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McIntrye and Justice Breyer has previously stated, by way of
analogy, that “[i]f International Shoe stands for anything, it is
that a truly interstate business may not shield itself from suit
by a careful but formalistic structuring of its business
dealings.” 355
Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision argued that
sovereignty, not fairness, is the touchstone of the jurisdictional
analysis, 356 but his view was not the majority view, and there
is reason to think that even his view would be qualified if
applied to an attempt to collect state tax. Justice Kennedy’s
sovereignty analysis has been criticized for being
ambiguous. 357 However, it is at least clear that his implicit
concern relates to the legal doctrines of choice of law and full
faith and credit. 358 In essence, the concern is that if an
inappropriate forum becomes the chosen state of adjudication,
the final decision rendered by that court—applying that state’s
law, as a matter of full faith and credit—operates to the
detriment of the appropriate state of adjudication. 359 Also,
355. See Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 30 (1st
Cir. 1988) (quoting Vencedor Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Gaugler Industries, 557
F.2d 886, 891 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding the fact that
title to the allegedly defective products sold passed outside the jurisdiction in
question was immaterial to the due process question).
356. 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J).
357. See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with it?
Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729,
740 (2012); Steinman, supra note 318, at 496–98.
358. See 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J.) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the
law”) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)
(“[T]he Framers also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of
sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their
courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the
original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Brilmayer
and Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by
Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C.
L. Rev. 617, 624 (stating that McIntyre is “but the latest case to adopt some of
[the] line of thinking . . . that a state could use the operation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to efface the borders of its sister states and threaten their
authority.”).
359. See Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 1163 (2013) (“concerns about the sovereign interests of other jurisdictions
and the expectations of parties who rely on particular rules of law dominate the
discussion in a closely related doctrinal area: choice of law . . . [n]ot surprisingly,
choice of law is the “elephant in the room” in most personal-jurisdiction cases”);
Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies
and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 819, 830 (1991)
(noting the “inextricable relationship between choice of law and jurisdictional
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such a decision, because rendered by the wrong jurisdiction, is
potentially unfair to the defendant. 360
Justice Kennedy’s sovereignty concerns have no analog
where a state seeks to tax the sales of a multistate business
made to persons in the state or the income of such a business
as fairly apportioned to the state. 361 There is no choice of law
or full faith and credit concern in these cases. Also, state
sovereignty has an additional, countervailing meaning when
evaluating state taxation that is not represented in the
adjudicative jurisdiction analysis. The U.S. Constitution
confers upon the states a sovereign right to impose taxes, 362
and the Court has recognized that under the Constitution
multistate businesses doing business in a state may be made
to pay their fair share of state tax. 363 These points in sum
suggest that when evaluating state taxation Justice Kennedy’s
state-versus-state sovereignty concerns should simply not
apply.
Justice Kennedy’s McIntyre decision – focused as it was on
a foreign defendant—also broached possible concerns with
respect to a second kind of sovereignty, state-versus-federal
judicial sovereignty. 364 His general notion was that certain
claims might be subject to federal judicial jurisdiction rather
than state judicial jurisdiction. 365 But these concerns are also
issues”); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 753 (1987) (“Choice of law and
choice of jurisdiction are not significantly different issues. Both seek to determine
whether the forum can act as sovereign in one respect or another.”) (footnote
omitted).
360. See supra notes 279-80 and 359 and accompanying text.
361. See Hecht, supra note 212, at 9 (stating that the choice of law concerns
that have influenced the Supreme Court’s thinking about adjudicative
jurisdiction are “irrelevant to [state] tax enforcement jurisdiction”).
362. See Fatale supra note 7, at 42. See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
750–51 (1999) (recognizing the importance of the states’ fisc as furthering their
“ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens”) (Kennedy J.)
(opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia).
363. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy recently
referenced this specific point in his concurrence in DMA Marketing Assn. v.
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In that opinion,
Justice Kennedy criticized the physical presence sales tax nexus rule stated in
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), as “now inflicting extreme harm
and unfairness on the States”. . . resulting in the weakening of the “States’
education systems, healthcare services, and infrastructure.” Id. For a discussion
of Quill, see supra notes 85–98 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 281–82 and accompanying text.
365. See 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.) (stating also [“o]urs is a legal system
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each
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irrelevant when evaluating state taxation because there is no
functional overlap between state and federal taxation since the
state and federal governments each impose distinct taxes. 366
There is, of course, no certainty that Justice Kennedy’s
sovereignty rationale will ever be supported by a majority of
the Supreme Court’s Justices. However, should this rationale
one day be supported by the Court more generally, it would
have to be re-stated with respect to the considerations that are
unique to state taxation. There would be no inconsistency in
drawing such a distinction between adjudicative and state tax
jurisdiction.
Although the Court has stated that the
jurisdiction rules that apply to state taxation are “comparable”
to those that apply for purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction 367
that articulation allows for differences, and three of the four
Justices that signed the plurality decision in McIntyre have
specifically expressed their understanding that there can be
differences between the two jurisdictional standards. 368
III.

CURRENT AREAS OF CONTROVERSY

Several recent state corporate income and sales tax cases
have evaluated due process jurisdiction questions. 369 The Due
Process Clause has also been recently considered in federal
cases and commentary pertaining to Congressional legislation
that has either been enacted or proposed with respect to state
tax jurisdiction. 370
This section considers these recent
developments.
A. Recent State Corporate Income Taxes Cases
In the aftermath of Quill Corp. v North Dakota, 371 there
was a series of state corporate income tax cases that evaluated

with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”) (quotes omitted).
366. Fatale, supra note 7, at 48.
367. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
368. Id. at 319–20 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J. and Thomas, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the majority opinion that “comparable” reasoning applies when
evaluating state tax jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause as compared with
the analysis applied for purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction, but noting that “I
do not understand this to mean that the due process standards for adjudicative
jurisdiction and those for legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction are necessarily
identical”).
369. See infra notes 371–419 and accompanying text.
370. See infra notes 420–43 and accompanying text
371. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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fact patterns in which a company engaged in tax planning
sought to avoid nexus on the part of one or more of its corporate
affiliates by arguing that those affiliates lacked “physical
presence” Commerce Clause nexus with the state. 372 These
fact patterns resulted in a series of state tax cases in which the
court concluded that the Quill physical presence standard did
not apply outside the context of state sales tax. 373
In particular, many of the corporate income tax nexus
cases decided by the states after Quill were cases where the
general facts were that an in-state retailer separately
incorporated an out-of-state affiliate as an “intangible holding
company” (IHC). 374 In these cases the retailer transferred its
valuable trademarks to the IHC, then licensed back the right
to use the trademarks for a royalty payment paid in connection
with the in-state sale of trademarked products – a payment
that the retailer then deducted for state income tax
purposes. 375 The arrangement was intended to shift the instate retailer’s otherwise taxable income outside the state’s
taxing jurisdiction. 376
To address the IHC tax planning, some states sought to
apply income tax to the royalty paid by the retailer by asserting
tax jurisdiction over the IHC based upon the retailer’s in-state
use of the trademarks. 377 The state courts generally upheld
these nexus assertions on the theory that in the absence of a
physical presence standard the question under the Commerce
Clause is whether the taxpayer is engaged in sufficient in-state
market exploitation. 378
In the various IHC cases that post-date Quill, the issue
was almost always the application of the Commerce Clause,
because taxpayers were focused on extending the Quill
physical presence standard to the states’ corporate income

372. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See also Comptroller of
Treasury v. Syl, Inc., 825 A.2d 399 (Md. 2003) (similar).
373. See the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
374. See the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
375. For a description of this structure as a tax planning arrangement, see
Sheldon H. Laskin, Only a Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing that
which Enriches, 22 AKRON TAX J. 1, 4–8 (2007).
376. See id.
377. See generally the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106.
378. See generally the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106.
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taxes. 379 The repeated losses by taxpayers in these cases
resulted in revised tax planning and a shift in focus from the
Commerce Clause to the Due Process Clause. 380 Two recent
state Supreme Court cases in which the taxpayer prevailed,
Scioto Ins. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n 381 and Griffith v.
ConAgra Brands, Inc., 382 illustrate this trend. 383
In Scioto, the tax planning pertained to an IHC
established by the fast food company, Wendy’s. 384 The tax
planning was structured such that the IHC did not directly
license the trademarks to an affiliate doing business in the
state, but rather licensed the trademarks to an intermediate
affiliate, which then licensed the trademarks to another
affiliate doing business in the state. 385 The trademarks and
similar intangible property transferred to the IHC were used
at Wendy’s restaurants. 386 The parent corporation, Wendy’s
International, had previously licensed this intangible property
directly to the in-state restaurants, 387 but then the parent
transferred the trademarks to a subsidiary IHC, licensed the
marks from the IHC, and sublicensed the marks to the
restaurants. 388 The issue was whether jurisdiction could be
379. The due process analysis in these cases was secondary, see generally the
affiliate licensing cases cited at note 106, and in three of the cases, A&F
Trademark, 605 S.E.2d 187, Lanco, 908 A.2d 176, and Geoffrey, 452 Mass. 17, 23
n.9 (2009), no due process argument was even made.
380. See, e.g., Benton, et al., supra note 11 (“The reemergence of the due
process clause in McIntyre . . . has come at a crucial time for state taxpayers, who
have been watching for years as states have chipped away at the constitutional
contours set forth in Quill and other U.S. Supreme Court decisions.”).
381. 279 P.3d 782 (Okla. 2012).
382. 728 S.E.2d 74 (W.Va. 2012).
383. A recent federal bankruptcy case also applied the Due Process Clause
along with the Commerce Clause to prevent the imposition of state tax on a
parent company that wholly owned several in-state REITs. See In re Washington
Mutual, Inc., 485 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012). But see Bridges v. Autozone
Properties, Inc., 900 S,2d 784, 800-809 (La. 2009) (finding that a parent
corporation was subject to tax under the Due Process Clause based on the in-state
activity of a wholly-owned REIT). State tax planning with respect to REITs has
also been common in recent years. See, e.g., BankBoston Corp. v. Comm’r of
Revenue, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 156 (2007); Charles F. Barnwell, “Is State Tax
Planning Still Viable? REITs and RICs,” ST. TAX TODAY, Nov. 22, 2010.
384. See 279 P.3d at 783.
385. See 279 P.3d at 783, 784–85 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting).
386. Id. Some of the in-state restaurants were affiliate-owned and some were
franchisee-owned. Id. at 785 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting).
387. Such direct licensing activity would have established nexus under
Oklahoma law. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632, 638
(Okla. Ct. App. 2005).
388. 279 P.3d at 783, 784–85 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting).
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asserted over the IHC, despite the fact that the IHC arguably
had no contractual privity with the state. 389 The exact amount
of royalties was not stated, but the tax assessment was nearly
$500,000. 390 The dissent noted the fact that the corporate
structure was motivated by tax purposes. 391 Similar tax
planning involving indirect or “embedded” royalties has been
common on the part of other taxpayers and in other states. 392
In ConAgra, the IHC licensed the trademarks to affiliates
and other entities outside the state and received significant
royalties from the efforts of those entities marketing the
company’s trademarked products inside the state. 393 There
was a joint stipulation of facts that the court concluded was
“favorable to the taxpayer” 394 that the court repeated or made
reference to four times, including in its holding. 395 This
stipulation included the fact that “all products bearing the
trademarks and trade names were manufactured solely by
unrelated or affiliated licensees of the foreign licensor outside
of West Virginia.” 396 Twice the court singled out what it
seemed to consider the most important stipulated fact – that
the IHC “did not direct or dictate how the licensees distributed
the products bearing the trademarks and trade names.” 397

389. Id.
390. Id. at 785 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting).
391. Id. at 788 (“The motivation behind this corporate anatomy was to shelter
[from state tax] royalties generated from use of Wendy’s trademarks and the
company’s proprietary information throughout the United States.”).
392. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, 83
Mass. App. Ct. 65, 81 (2013). See also Lynnley Browning, Critics Call Delaware
a Tax Haven, NEW YORK TIMES, May 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/30/business/30delaware.html?_r=0 (noting the comments of Michael
Mazerov that “embedded royalty” companies are a new way to exploit the state
tax IHC “loophole”).
393. See 728 S.E.2d at 76 (“Through the execution of licensing agreements,
[the IHC] began collecting royalty payments for the use of its trademarks and
trade names by various unrelated, third party licensees and [company] affiliated
licensees. The trademarks and trade names, to name but a few, included familiar
brands, such as Armour, Butterball, Country Skillet, Healthy Choice, Kid
Cuisine, Morton, Swift and Swift Premium. The royalties were collected by [the
IHC] from the sale by the licensees of food products bearing the trademarks and
trade names to clients and customers throughout the United States, including
West Virginia”) (emphasis added); id. at 77 (noting that during the 3-year audit
period the in-state licenses generated between $19,269,000 and $46,247,000 in
sales, resulting in royalties for the IHC of approximately $1,156,000).
394. Id. at 82
395. See id. at 76, 82, 84.
396. Id. at 84.
397. See id. at 76, 82.
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Assuming that the IHC—or the company more generally—did
in fact engage in this activity, as would seem likely as a
practical matter, the case may mostly suggest a failure of proof
on the part of the state. 398
In both Scioto and ConAgra, the taxpayer prevailed in
whole or in part on due process grounds. 399 But the analysis in
each case is obviously incorrect because due process
jurisdiction cannot be defeated merely by re-structuring a
company’s in-state market penetration such that this targeting
is indirect—certainly not when the company generates
significant in-state sales. 400 Each fact pattern suggests that it

398. A similar failure of proof may have undermined the plaintiff’s case in the
Supreme Court’s recent decision, McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). See supra note
302 and accompanying text. See also infra note 400 (discussing further the
ConAgra facts during the relevant tax years).
399. See Scioto, 279 P.3d at 784; ConAgra, 728 S.E.2d at 84. Neither decision
relied upon McIntyre, although ConAgra purported to rely on Justice Brennan’s
decision in Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See ConAgra, 728 S.E.2d at 82–83 (citing
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)). ConAgra also concluded, with
reference to its due process analysis, that there was no state tax jurisdiction
under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 84.
400. See supra notes 339–48 and accompanying text. See also Truck Renting
and Leasing Assn. v. Comm’r, 433 Mass. 733, 738–40 (2001) (finding due process
corporate income tax nexus with respect to an out-of-state trucking company
whose trucks were brought into the state by unrelated lessees because the
company’s income was derived from in-state property, i.e. the trucks, and the
company both knew and intended that its trucks would be driven in the state by
such lessees); Missouri Gas Energy v. Kansas Division of Property Valuation, 313
P.3d 789, 799–800 (Kan. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL 1364664 (2014) (finding
due process nexus for purposes of an ad valoreum property tax with respect to
out-of-state entities engaged in the delivery of natural gas where: (1) the entities’
gas was consigned to unrelated pipelines and stored in the state on an interim
basis to be subsequently delivered in another state and (2) the decision to store
the gas in the state was made by the unrelated pipelines).
The dissent in Scioto would have found jurisdiction under both the Due Process
Clause and Commerce Clause because the taxpayer “intentionally placed its
property into the stream of Oklahoma commerce, realizing the benefits and
protections afforded by the people and laws of this state.” See Scioto, 279 P.3d at
788 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, J., dissenting). In ConAgra, public records reveal
similar in-state market exploitation directed at the various states, including,
presumably, West Virginia. See ConAgra Form 10—K/A, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Comission, Apr. 29, 2005, http://www.epa.gov/region1//superfund
/sites/wellsgh/547715.pdf, at 37 (noting that during two of the years at issue in
ConAgra, 2002-2003, the company incurred “various types of marketing costs in
order to promote its products, including retailer incentives and consumer
incentives”); id. at 27 (noting that ConAgra’s retailer incentives during this
period were retailer-specific and its consumer incentives included consumer
coupons). See ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Comptroller, 2015 Md. Tax LEXIS 2, 3–
12 (Md. Tax Ct. 2015) (finding Due Process and Commerce Clause nexus as to the
IHC in ConAgra, “Brands,” on similar facts for a subset of the same tax years).
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was the result of tax planning that was intended to bring about
the court’s result. 401 However, the Supreme Court’s precedent
beginning with International Shoe Co. v. Washington 402—
which ushered in the Court’s modern due process analysis 403—
makes clear that the Court does not sanction the use of due
process fairness principles as a methodology for state tax
planning. 404
In contrast to Scioto and ConAgra, in Gore Enterprise
Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller, 405 Maryland’s highest court
rejected a taxpayer argument that the state lacked due process
jurisdiction as to a corporation that held patents for, and
provided financing services to, an in-state related retailer
corporation. 406 Gore concluded that nexus was appropriate
with respect to the out-of-state corporation because it was
engaged in integrated business activity with the in-state retail
corporation and had no “separate economic substance” apart
from that in-state corporation. 407 Such fact determinations are
frequently possible when an affiliated enterprise divides itself
into separate corporations for tax purposes and would seem
clearly to be appropriate under due process principles
evaluating fairness and notice. 408
401. As to Scioto, see supra notes 391–92 and accompanying text. ConAgra
does not reference tax planning, but the corporation owning the trademarks
resembles those in cases where the tax planning was exposed. See generally the
affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106. See also ConAgra Brands, Inc. v.
Comptroller, 2015 Md. Tax LEXIS at 8 (case evaluating similar facts during the
same tax years concludes “Brands was organized in part to obtain a reduction in
taxes”).
402. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
403. See supra notes 168–78 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 350–55 and accompanying text.
405. 87 A.3d 1263 (Md. 2014).
406. Id. at 1271–80. The court rejected the taxpayer’s related Commerce
Clause claim as well.
407. 87 A.3d at 1276–78, 1280.
408. Similarly, recent state tax cases have found for sales tax purposes that an
out-of-state Internet vendor is subject to tax in the state based upon the activities
of an affiliated corporation that owns and operates in-state retail stores. See
supra note 144 and accompanying text. See also John A. Swain, Cybertaxation
and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus? 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
419, 441–45, 465–67 (2002) (arguing that when an in-state corporation is engaged
in a unitary business with an out-of-state corporation that relationship, without
more, should confer nexus as to the out-of-state corporation for corporate income
tax purposes); Handel, supra note 212, at 663 (similar). A similar analysis to that
advocated by Professors Swain and Handel was used to justify the lower court
decision in Gore. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller, 60 A.3d 107, 115–17
(2013), aff’d 87 A.3d 1263 (Md. 2014). When the Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed that lower court decision in Gore, it stressed that it was re-focusing the
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Scioto, ConAgra, and Gore each suggest that state law
considerations can significantly impact the constitutional
nexus analysis. In Scioto, the court suggested that the state
could have addressed the tax inequity apparent on the facts
some other way—seemingly the court’s preference. 409 In
ConAgra, the court was unwilling to extend to the facts an
“economic presence” doctrine for evaluating constitutional
nexus that it had articulated in a prior case. 410 In Gore, the
court made clear that it was applying a judicial doctrine that
it had previously applied in state tax cases. 411
State law furnishes an important component of the tax
nexus analysis, as state efforts to assert jurisdiction cannot
advance to a constitutional test if they are not authorized
under state law. 412 But it is neither appropriate nor wise to
decision on the conclusion that the entities in question had no “separate economic
substance,” rather than on the conclusion that the entities were engaged in a
unitary business. 87 A.3d at 1276–78. However, the Court’s analysis nonetheless
resembled unitary analysis. See Mary C. Alexander and Jeffrey A. Friedman,
Maryland’s Gore-y Nexus Standard: Out-of-State Holding Companies Subject to
Tax, ST. TAX TODAY, April 14, 2014. See also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise
Tax Board, 237 Cal. App. 4th 193, 214-219 (2015) (finding nexus on behalf of outof-state corporations that bundled and securitized loans and serviced such loans
on behalf of in-state affiliates in part because the out-of-state corporations’
business activities were interdependent with the business activities of its in-state
affiliates). Harley Davidson rejected the taxpayer’s claim that there no due
process jurisdiction because the out-of-state corporations did not “target” the
state. See id. at 217-218.
409. The court’s decision is brief—less than 2 pages, see 279 P. 3d at 783–84—
but its discussion on this point is detailed:
The proper point at which Oklahoma can assess taxes on the amount that
Wendy’s International pays to Scioto is when those funds are in the hands of
Wendy’s International. If the Tax Commission believes the amount paid by
Wendy’s International to Scioto should be taxed, then the Tax Commission
should ask the Legislature to eliminate the deduction for payments made
under licensing arrangements like the one in this case. While the Tax
Commission is properly concerned with the taxation of business activity in
Oklahoma, the Tax Commission cannot unilaterally close deduction lacunae
or gaps in the revenue law with which the Commission disagrees. The proper
remedy for OTC is not to have the courts expand the . . . Tax Code’s scope. . .
but rather to press for the gap’s closure by the Legislature.
Id. at 784 (quotes omitted). The court also took three sentences to note that
the in-state activity of the restaurant chain, Wendy’s, brought about the payment
of other state taxes, as if that point was somehow legally relevant. See id. at 783.
410. 728 S.E.2d at 81–82 (referencing Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, 640
S.E.2d 226 (W.V. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007)).
411. 87 A. 3d at 1275–83 (citing prior Maryland cases).
412. In the midst of the various state cases that concluded that the states could
assert tax jurisdiction against an IHC licensing trademarks into the state, see
supra note 106, the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that the assertion of
this jurisdiction was impermissible under that state’s tax nexus statute. Acme
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render a decision on state law as a matter of constitutional
jurisprudence. The decisions in Scioto and ConAgra both
analogized to adjudicative jurisdiction principles to determine
that an out-of-state IHC established as one corporation within
a multiple-corporate affiliated enterprise engaged in selling instate food products was not subject to that state’s taxing
The inference is that in a hypothetical
jurisdiction. 413
situation, where an in-state resident is poisoned by a food
product of one of these companies, that the resident would be
foreclosed from bringing suit in his or her home state—the
state in which both the food product was purchased and eaten,
as well as the site of the tragedy—against the IHC, the
corporation within the group holding the corporate profits.
That result seems neither appropriate nor likely.
B. Recent State Cases and Federal Law Developments
with respect to State Sales Tax
With respect to sales tax, the application of the physical
presence safe harbor as stated by Quill Corp v. North Dakota 414
means that a state seeking to impose tax jurisdiction upon a
remote vendor—including a remote Internet vendor—is
necessarily focused on whether the vendor has some in-state
contact that falls outside such safe harbor. 415 Some of the
recent state cases finding sales tax jurisdiction have pertained
to a remote vendor that was affiliated with a corporation that
owned in-state stores engaged in selling similar products. 416
Other recent cases finding sales tax jurisdiction have been ones
where the remote vendor used related or unrelated parties to
solicit sales or to otherwise facilitate the in-state sale of its
Remote vendors are typically
products or services. 417
corporations and the application of the Quill physical presence
rule can be unclear when applied to a corporation—a legal
Royalty Co. v. Director of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72 (Mo. 2002). The logic employed
by Acme was questionable—it was a 4-3 decision in which the dissent claimed
that the majority’s decision “defie[d] economic reality.” Id. at 76. However, when
evaluating its state’s tax jurisdiction statute a state supreme court is at least
focused on a straightforward question that it is uniquely situated to consider.
413. See ConAgra, 728 S.E.2d at 82–83; Scioto, 279 P.3d at 784.
414. 504 U.S. 299 (1992).
415. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
416. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. See also Hecht, supra note
212, at 9; Plattner, supra note 142, at 193–94.
417. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. See also Hecht, supra
note 212, at 9; Plattner, supra note 142, at 193–94.
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construct that lacks inherent physical attributes—if the
corporation’s activities do not closely resemble those protected
by the Court in Quill. 418 Therefore, the states generally apply
a due process-like inquiry to determine whether a vendor’s instate contacts permit a determination that the vendor has
reasonably relied upon Quill. 419
Recent federal law developments with respect to state
taxes have included Congressional bills enacted or proposed
pursuant to the Commerce Clause to override the Quill
physical presence standard. 420 For example, in 2009 Congress
passed the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act, 421
which dispenses with the physical presence nexus requirement
that would otherwise apply, and requires e-sellers of cigarettes
as a matter of federal law to comply with the states’ cigarette
excise collection requirements. 422 The PACT Act imposes
federal penalties for failure to comply with the Act. 423 Congress
has also since the time of Quill considered broader legislation
that would preempt the application of Quill more generally as
to all types of taxable sales in the instance of large-sized
vendors. 424 Recently, such a bill, the Marketplace Fairness Act
(MFA), passed the Senate, 425 although its prospects in the
House remain uncertain. 426
The PACT Act applies even where an Internet seller has
sold only a single pack of cigarettes into a state. 427 In part
because of this low threshold several vendors that were to
become subject to the Act brought suit in federal court prior to
the Act’s effective date to enjoin its enforcement, on the theory
that the law would apply even in cases in which its application

418. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
419. See generally supra notes 121–47 and accompanying text.
420. See The Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (“PACT”) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 375
et seq.; The Marketplace Fairness Act (“MFA”), S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th
Cong. (2013).
421. 15 U.S.C. § 375 et seq.
422. 15 U.S.C. §§ 375–76(a).
423. 15 U.S.C. §§ 377–78.
424. See Swain, Cybertaxation, supra note 408 n.22.
425. See Harry J. Reske, U.S Senate Approves Marketplace Fairness Act,
STATE TAX TODAY, May 6, 2013 (noting the U.S. Senate’s passage of the S.743 by
a 69-27 vote “[a]fter more than a decade of deliberation”).
426. See Jennifer DePaul, House & Senate Republicans Echo Boehner’s Pledge
to Kill MFA, STATE TAX TODAY, Nov. 19, 2014.
427. See Red Earth LLC v. US, 657 F.3d 138, 145 (2012); Gordon v. Holder,
721 F.3d 638, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

2015]

DUE PROCESS & TAX JURISDICTION

633

would violate the Due Process Clause. 428 A preliminary
injunction was issued with respect to the state tax provisions
set forth in the Act in two of the three cases, but was denied in
the third. 429
The preliminary injunctions issued in the recent PACT Act
cases were largely justified in reliance upon Justice Breyer’s
statement in McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 430 that no
prior Supreme Court decision had concluded that a single instate sale would confer adjudicative jurisdiction. 431 The 2nd
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction
on this basis, but recognized that the Supreme Court’s prior
cases did not necessarily suggest that a single in-state sale
could never result in due process jurisdiction. 432 The court
stated that “the underlying constitutional question is close,”
and that in such cases a court “should uphold the injunction
and remand for trial on the merits.” 433 The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals similarly upheld a preliminary injunction in
reliance upon Justice Breyer’s statement in McIntyre
suggesting that a single in-state sale might not confer due

428. Id. See also Musser’s Inc. v. United States, 1 F. Supp 3d. 308, 310 (E.D.
Pa. 2014).
429. The preliminary injunctions were issued in Red Earth, see 657 F.3d at
145, and Gordon, see 721 F.3d at 645. The preliminary injunction was denied in
Musser’s. See 1 F. Supp at 310. In Musser’s, the court subsequently denied a
motion for consideration and then, in a subsequent action, dismissed the
plaintiff’s complaint. Id. Although the issue is not discussed in any of the three
cases, the cases were apparently each brought as “facial” constitutional
challenges to the PACT Act, as opposed to “as applied” constitutional challenges,
and therefore the two preliminary injunctions were issued on this basis. See
generally Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 142–43, 148 (discussing the issuing of the
injunction); Gordon, 721 F.3d at 641 (same); Musser’s, 1 F. Supp at 310
(discussing the denial of the injunction). Because the issue is not discussed in
any of the cases, it is not clear how the claims could appropriately be brought as
facial constitutional challenges since typically “a plaintiff can only succeed in a
facial challenge by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid’, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its
applications.” See Washington State Grange v Washington State Republican
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008), (quoting United States v Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745 (1987)).
430. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
431. Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 145 (citing McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer,
J., concurring); Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing
McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s statement
may have been incorrect and in any event the Supreme Court’s precedents
suggest that a single sale may confer adjudicative jurisdiction in some instances.
See supra notes 303, 336 and accompanying text.
432. Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 145.
433. Id.
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process jurisdiction. 434 The D.C. Circuit Court concluded,
however, similar to the court in the 2nd circuit, that Justice
Breyer’s statement potentially allowed for a finding of
jurisdiction, and so enjoined the case for further fact finding. 435
The D.C. Circuit Court stated that “[w]hile it may prove to be
the case that, in the Internet age, a single sale establishes
‘minimum contacts’ as a matter of law, this seems like precisely
the sort of difficult constitutional question on which our
analysis would benefit from factual development.” 436
The D.C Circuit Court’s decision was rendered by a 2-1
vote. 437 The dissenting judge concluded that the plaintiff’s
“Due Process Clause claim is entirely without merit” because
compliance with the PACT Act is required under federal and
not state law. 438 A similar conclusion informed the holding in
a third, similar PACT Act case, where a Pennsylvania federal
district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction, because
“the [PACT] Act’s tax-payment requirement is not being
imposed by a state, acting unilaterally, but by Congress, and
the legislative due process analysis must reflect the federal
character of the legislation.” 439 The Pennsylvania district court
decision stated that “[i]nterstate businesses are subject to the
legislative jurisdiction of Congress, which is free to require
compliance with state and local law.” 440 It also stated that
“[a]ll interstate businesses are subject to the legislative

434. Gordon, 721 F.3d at 652. (“The Supreme Court has never found ‘that a
single isolated sale . . . is sufficient’ ” to establish minimum contacts.”) (quoting
Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 145).
435. Id.
436. Id. The case was later dismissed with prejudice upon agreement by the
parties. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188691 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). The PACT Act is now
fully enforceable in the 2nd Circuit. See http://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/
pact-act-now-fully-enforceable.
437. See Gordon, 721 F.3d 638.
438. Id. at 659 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). That dissenting judge observed
that:
When Congress enacts a federal law of this kind and renders violators of
that law subject to federal criminal prosecution or federal civil suit, the
law does not violate the minimum contacts principle of the Due Process
Clause. The reason is quite simple: In such federal-law cases, the
relevant sovereign and jurisdiction is the United States, not one of the
individual States.
439. Musser’s, 1 F. Supp. at 315.
440. Id. (the court also quoted International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315: “It is no
longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may
authorize the states, in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose
burdens upon it”).

2015]

DUE PROCESS & TAX JURISDICTION

635

jurisdiction of Congress who is free to require compliance with
state law as a condition of engaging in interstate commerce.” 441
The mixed success of the plaintiffs in the PACT Act cases
has caused vendors anticipating the passage of the MFA to
think that they may be able to prevent enforcement of the
MFA—at least in select instances—on similar due process
grounds. 442 The MFA would require an Internet vendor that
has total gross receipts from Internet sales exceeding
$1,000,000 to begin collecting sales and use tax in the
subsequent tax year with respect to any state that has met the
sales and use tax simplification standards set forth in the
Act. 443 Some commentators have argued that even though the
only vendors subject to the Act are those with $1,000,000 or
more in total sales, those vendors may be able to challenge the
application of the law in any state where the vendor’s sales are
of lesser significance. 444
Congressional bills like the MFA that would address the
jurisdictional limits that apply to the states’ sales and use tax
collection duty to be imposed upon remote vendors have been

441. Id.
442. See James Bull Sterling, Survey of South Carolina Law: Tax Law: Remote
Seller Sales and Use Tax Law: How Proposed Law will Impact South Carolina,
65 S.C. L. REV. 851, 851 n.25 (“A remote seller could argue the Act violates its
individual due process rights because even though the remote seller has
aggregate sales over the $1 million mark, it only makes few sales into a particular
state.”); Kenneth F. Warren, Regulators Throughout American History Have Been
Reluctant to Regulate Cigars and the FDA Still is Today, But Why?, 8 Pitt. J.
ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 160, 187, 187 n.63 (2014) (noting the argument of
Michael P. Abate that the MFA and the PACT Act may both ultimately fail legal
challenges under the Due Process Clause) (citing Michael P. Abate, E-Commerce
Taxation Bill Might be Unconstitutional, LAW 360 (Apr. 30, 2013)); Denning,
supra note 11, at 841 (citing Red Earth as offering “a preview of the difficulties
Congress may face” with respect to succeeding with the MFA). See also State’s
Attorneys General: Marketplace Fairness Act Would Violate Due Process Clause,
STATE TAX TODAY, June 18, 2013 (referencing a letter written by 3 state attorney
generals “on behalf of remote sales retailers in our states” stating, inter alia, “any
state’s efforts to enforce the collection of use tax proceeds from remote sales
retailers with little or no contact with the taxing authority will remain
constitutionally suspect”).
443. See generally S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th Cong. (2013).
444. See supra note 442. These would be “as applied” constitutional challenges
that could potentially succeed with respect to individual vendors as to certain
states, but even if successful, would not threaten the application of the MFA more
generally. See supra note 429 and accompanying test. As the Supreme Court has
recently stated, a facial challenge to a federal statute on constitutional grounds
“must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.” See Washington
State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449.
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proposed dating back prior to Quill 445, so it is difficult to be too
optimistic that such a bill will one day become law. However,
if the law passes, there are at least two obvious problems with
the argument that the MFA may be subject to challenge in
certain states on due process grounds—both of which are
suggested by the PACT Act analogy.
As noted, two courts have issued preliminary injunctions
in PACT Act cases on due process grounds on the theory that
the Act can apply to an Internet vendor that sells only a single
pack of cigarettes into the state. 446 Those injunctions were
specifically justified in reliance on Justice Breyer’s statement
in McIntyre that the Supreme Court has never found due
process jurisdiction in a case in which the defendant has made
only a single sale into the state. 447 But the two PACT Act cases
both acknowledged that the Court has not ruled out that there
could be jurisdiction on such facts. 448
Also, more
fundamentally, unlike the PACT Act, the MFA cannot be
imposed on a remote vendor that makes only a single small instate sale. 449 To be subject to the MFA a remote vendor would
have to make significant sales—and only then would it be able
to raise a potential due process issue as to specific states where
its volume of sales is relatively small. 450 The picture of a
remote vendor that makes only one small in-state sale, on
which facts the PACT Act could apply, is very different from
that of a vendor that makes significant sales, with only a
relatively small volume of sales in one or more states. Due
process fairness concerns are not so obviously implicated in the
latter instance. 451
The general issue addressed in the PACT Act cases by the
Pennsylvania District Court and the dissenting opinion in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also lurks in the MFA context. 452
Compliance with the MFA would be required under a federal
law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 453 Congress is
445. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318, 318 n.11 (noting Congressional bills that would
have ‘overrule[d]’ the Bellas Hess rule.”) (quotes in the original).
446. See supra notes 427–29 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 430–31 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 432–36 and accompanying text.
449. See generally S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th Cong. (2013).
450. Id.
451. See supra notes 306–07 and 333–38 and accompanying text.
452. Musser’s, 1 F. Supp at 315; Gordon, 721 F.3d at 659 (Kavanaugh,
dissenting).
453. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have the power “to regulate
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permitted, in its discretion, to both protect and burden
commerce under the Commerce Clause 454—a point that Quill
itself made when suggesting that Congress enact a bill like the
MFA. 455
Some commentators who have evaluated a
prospective challenge to the MFA have argued that,
notwithstanding the Commerce Clause, Congressional bills
cannot override a business taxpayer’s due process rights. 456
But it is likely that because such rights are not “fundamental
rights” or “liberty interests” Congress would not be so
constrained. 457 Also, in any event, it is questionable whether
it really is unfair as a matter of due process for a company with
significant U.S. sales to be made to comply with the sales tax
laws in the various states in which the company make sales. 458
Certainly the enactment of a Congressional law would seem to
give such large-size companies fair notice of their state sales
and use tax responsibilities. 459
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has been in a state of evolution throughout the

commerce . . . among the several states”).
454. See Ne. Bancorp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys, 472 U.S. 159,
174 (1985); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946).
455. 504 U.S. at 318 (citing Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S.
408 (1946) for the proposition that “[n]o matter how we evaluate the burdens that
use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with
our conclusions.”).
456. See generally the articles cited supra note 442.
457. See William Cohen, “Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional
State Laws: Forgotten Solutions to an Old Enigma,” 35 STAN. L. REV. 385, 412–
14, 422 (1983) (arguing that Congress can validate state tax laws and thereby
immunize those laws from a potential Constitutional challenge, including one
initiated under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, in any instance
where individual “liberty interests” are not impaired); Paul J. Hartman,
Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND. L. REV. 993,
1023–24 (1986) (stating that “due process clause protection [may have] more
elasticity in the context of fiscal matters in federalism than the clause does in a
civil rights context” and that congressional judgments that might be said to
impair due process in the state tax context are more likely to be permissible
“because Congress would not be restricting due process in the context of
fundamental constitutional rights or suspect classifications”).
458. See supra notes 306–07 and 333–38 and accompanying text.
459. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) involved a
similar fact pattern since the state employer tax requirement at issue in that case
had been specifically authorized by Congress, thereby dispensing with any
Commerce Clause claim on the part of the petitioner-corporation. See supra note
186 and accompanying text.

638

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:55

Court’s history, but now focuses primarily on policing
discriminatory state action, consistent with the Framers’
intent. 460 As a result, subjective questions concerning the
degree to which a state law burdens interstate commerce or
whether an economic actor is sufficiently present in a state to
be subject to state authority have been generally eliminated
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny in state tax cases. 461
Since the time of the 14th Amendment, the Court has
generally considered whether the imposition of a state tax is
consistent with due process and Commerce Clause
As the Court’s various Commerce Clause
principles. 462
standards for testing state tax jurisdiction have diminished in
importance, its due process standards have become more
important. 463
Several recent Supreme Court cases have considered the
Court’s due process standards as applied to determine
adjudicative jurisdiction. 464 Because the standard applied for
purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction is comparable to that
applied for state tax purposes, these recent Supreme Court
cases are relevant to the state tax analysis. 465 One of the
Court’s recent cases, J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 466 is of
particular importance to the analysis because McIntyre is a
specific jurisdiction case, similar to most state tax cases, and
McIntyre pertained to jurisdiction asserted against a business
entity doing business in multiple states. 467 Also, McIntyre is a
plurality decision that has rendered a somewhat ambiguous
precedent, and that has created some concern that the Court
has narrowed the circumstances in which adjudicative
jurisdiction will lie. 468 However, McIntyre should have no
impact on the typical case pertaining to state tax jurisdiction
applied to a multistate business because, among other things,

460. See generally supra Part I.B.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 161, 169–
72 and accompanying text.
465. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
466. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
467. See supra notes 16–17, 211–12 and accompanying text. Compare Walden
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (specific jurisdiction case pertaining to an
individual who brought suit in Nevada based on allegedly tortuous conduct that
took place in another state). See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
468. See generally supra Part II.E.
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McIntyre is not implicated when a business targets a state’s
market either directly or indirectly and that business’ in-state
sales volume or market exploitation is significant. 469
Recent state tax cases and federal developments with
respect to state taxation have raised different issues
concerning the future application of due process principles in
the context of state tax jurisdiction, some of which depend upon
whether the state tax at issue is a corporate income tax or sale
tax. 470 In general, those issues will necessarily be resolved over
the course of time. However, despite some recent commentator
statements claiming that the re-emergence of the Due Process
Clause as an important principle probing state tax jurisdiction
may result in significant restrictions placed upon the
states 471—and some taxpayer victories in state tax cases where
the Due Process Clause has seemed to serve this purpose 472—
state taxing agencies should take comfort in the larger trend.
A due process jurisdictional standard emphasizing
considerations of fairness and notice is a better standard for
purposes of state tax administration than the historical
alternative, which emphasized arbitrary and economically
questionable limitations imposed under the Commerce Clause.

469. See supra notes 339–43 and accompanying text.
470. See generally supra Part III.
471. See supra note 11 and accompany text. See also supra notes 341 and 442
and accompanying text).
472. See generally supra Part III.A.

